Price oligopoly as a cooperative game

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider an oligopolistic market as follows. In the market, one good is traded for money. Each oligopolist is a price setter and has the same linear cost function. Each buyer is a price taker and buys the good from oligopolists setting the lowest price. We formulate this market as a cooperative game, and consider two kinds of solution concepts, the core and a bargaining set of the game. First we show that in the monopolistic market, the core gives the monopoly price, but in the oligopolistic market, the core is empty. Second, we obtain the bargaining set of the oligopolistic market.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)137-150
Number of pages14
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume7
Issue number3-4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1978 Sep
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Oligopoly
oligopoly
Cooperative Game
market
Bargaining
Solution Concepts
monopoly
Linear Function
Cost Function
Market
Cooperative game
Lowest
money
Game
costs

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Price oligopoly as a cooperative game. / Kaneko, Mamoru.

In: International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 7, No. 3-4, 09.1978, p. 137-150.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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