Pricing and operation in deregulated electricity market by noncooperative game

L. Geerli, L. Chen, R. Yokoyama

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    12 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Pricing structure is becoming considerably important for both electric utility industries and their customers. This paper derives an operation rule for a market model with an electric utility and independent power producers (IPPs) as players of the noncooperative game. The derived operation rules reflecting the competition can be viewed as an extension of the conventional equalizing incremental cost method for the deregulated power systems. As indicated in this paper, the prices of electricity for purchases and sales are equal to the incremental costs of the generators of IPPs but are generally cheaper than the incremental cost of the generators belonging to the utility. To examine the proposed approach, several systems are used as the demonstrated examples in this paper.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)133-139
    Number of pages7
    JournalElectric Power Systems Research
    Volume57
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2001 Mar 5

    Fingerprint

    Electric utilities
    Costs
    Sales
    Electricity
    Power markets
    Industry

    Keywords

    • Deregulation
    • Equalizing increment cost
    • Game theory
    • Market
    • Power systems
    • Pricing

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Energy Engineering and Power Technology
    • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

    Cite this

    Pricing and operation in deregulated electricity market by noncooperative game. / Geerli, L.; Chen, L.; Yokoyama, R.

    In: Electric Power Systems Research, Vol. 57, No. 2, 05.03.2001, p. 133-139.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Geerli, L. ; Chen, L. ; Yokoyama, R. / Pricing and operation in deregulated electricity market by noncooperative game. In: Electric Power Systems Research. 2001 ; Vol. 57, No. 2. pp. 133-139.
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