Private law enforcement with competing groups

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This paper introduces groups that are in conflict against each other in law enforcement policy. These groups can have an effect on the process of law enforcement by making upfront investments, such as bribes. We also investigate consequences when a policy maker acts to maximize a bribe instead of social welfare. Thus, this paper presents an inclusive framework for incorporating private law enforcement, corruption and avoidance activities. This article shows that this competition can lead to moderate and more efficient law enforcement activities. This indicates that inefficient law enforcement by authority with harm reduction motivation can be avoided. Additionally, this paper shows that depending on the policy maker’s objection between rent-seeking motivation or social welfare maximizer, deterrence effects vary. This paper provides a clear mechanism that the rent-seeking motivated policy maker tends to set less severe enforcement policies than the social welfare level.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)285-297
Number of pages13
JournalEconomics of Governance
Volume19
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018 Aug 1

Fingerprint

Law enforcement
Private law
Politicians
Social welfare
Rent-seeking
Bribes
Avoidance
Authority
Deterrence
Harm reduction
Enforcement
Corruption

Keywords

  • Crime
  • Interest groups
  • Law enforcement
  • Rent seeking

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Cite this

Private law enforcement with competing groups. / Yahagi, Ken.

In: Economics of Governance, Vol. 19, No. 3, 01.08.2018, p. 285-297.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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