Privatizacija i zagad{stroke}enje okoliša u mješovitom duopolu

Translated title of the contribution: Privatization and environmental pollution in a mixed duopoly

Jiancai Pi, Li Yang, Yu Zhou

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper establishes mixed duopoly game-theoretical models to investigate the economic impacts exerted by privatization in the presence of the environmental pollution. When the residents' environmental preference is introduced to the public firm's objective function, we mainly find that privatization may increase the public firm's output, decrease the private firms' outputs, and exert no impacts on social welfare. These findings run contrast to the common findings of the studies on privatization. Moreover, Cournot competition and Stackelberg competition are separately analyzed to show that our findings are robust and irrelevant with the firms' moves. This paper highlights the role the environmental pollution and residents' environmental preference play in determining the economic impacts exerted by privatization.

Original languageUndefined/Unknown
Pages (from-to)163-192
Number of pages30
JournalZbornik Radova Ekonomskog Fakultet au Rijeci
Volume31
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2013 Dec 30
Externally publishedYes

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Keywords

  • Cournot competition
  • Environmental pollution
  • Mixed duopoly
  • Privatization
  • Residents' environmental preference
  • Stackelberg competition

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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