Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

17 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider the problem of assigning indivisible goods among a group of agents with lotteries when the preference profile is single-peaked. Unfortunately, even on this restricted domain of preferences, equal treatment of equals, stochastic dominance efficiency, and stochastic dominance strategy-proofness are incompatible.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)203-215
Number of pages13
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume41
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013 Jun 1
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

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