Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences

Yoichi Kasajima

doi:10.1007/s00355-012-0674-2

Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences

Yoichi Kasajima^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

18 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider the problem of assigning indivisible goods among a group of agents with lotteries when the preference profile is single-peaked. Unfortunately, even on this restricted domain of preferences, equal treatment of equals, stochastic dominance efficiency, and stochastic dominance strategy-proofness are incompatible.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	203-215
Number of pages	13
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	41
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0674-2
Publication status	Published - 2013 Jun 1
Externally published	Yes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1007/s00355-012-0674-2

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Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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