Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider the problem of assigning indivisible goods among a group of agents with lotteries when the preference profile is single-peaked. Unfortunately, even on this restricted domain of preferences, equal treatment of equals, stochastic dominance efficiency, and stochastic dominance strategy-proofness are incompatible.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)203-215
Number of pages13
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume41
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013 Jun
Externally publishedYes

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equal treatment
efficiency
Group
Assignment
Stochastic dominance
Single-peaked preferences
Equal treatment
Strategy-proofness
Lottery
Restricted domain

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)

Cite this

Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences. / Kasajima, Yoichi.

In: Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 41, No. 1, 06.2013, p. 203-215.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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