Product R and D Investment Policies in an International Duopoly

Yumiko Taba, Yasunori Ishii

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    4 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    This study analyzes the optimal product R&D investment policies of a developed and a developing country in an international Cournot duopoly where firms from these two countries compete through endogenous quality-quantity decisions. We explore a new international trade model by using demand functions derived from utility functions. We find that the optimal product R&D investment policies for both countries are subsidies. This study counters a finding that used Hotelling-type demand functions and it partially modifies another result that adopted the same demand functions but with an international Bertrand duopoly.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)574-582
    Number of pages9
    JournalReview of Development Economics
    Volume20
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2016 May 1

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    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Geography, Planning and Development
    • Development

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