Properties based on relative contributions for cooperative games with transferable utilities

Yoshio Kamijo, Takumi Kongo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

By focusing on players’ relative contributions, we study some properties for values in positive cooperative games with transferable utilities. The well-known properties of symmetry (also known as “equal treatment of equals”) and marginality are based on players’ marginal contributions to coalitions. Both Myerson’s balanced contributions property and its generalization of the balanced cycle contributions property (Kamijo and Kongo Int J of Game Theory 39:563–571, 2010; BCC) are based on players’ marginal contributions to other players. We define relative versions of marginality and BCC by replacing marginal contributions with relative contributions, and examine efficient values satisfying each of the two properties. On the class of positive games, a relative variation of marginality is incompatible with efficiency, and together with efficiency and the invariance property with respect to the payoffs of players under a player deletion, a relative variation of BCC characterizes the proportional value and egalitarian value in a unified manner.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)77-87
Number of pages11
JournalTheory and Decision
Volume78
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Axiomatic characterization
  • Cooperative games
  • Egalitarian value
  • Proportional value
  • Relative contributions

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Decision Sciences(all)
  • Developmental and Educational Psychology
  • Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
  • Applied Psychology
  • Social Sciences(all)
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
  • Computer Science Applications

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