Prospect utilitarianism: A better alternative to sufficientarianism

Hun Chung

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Ever since the publication of Harry Frankfurt’s “Equality as a Moral Ideal” (Ethics 98(1):21–43, 1987), the doctrine of sufficiency has attracted great attention among both ethical theorists and political philosophers. The doctrine of sufficiency (or sufficientarianism) consists of two main theses: the positive thesis states that it is morally important for people to have enough; and the negative thesis states that once everybody has enough, relative inequality has absolutely no moral importance. Many political philosophers have presented different versions of sufficientarianism that retain the general spirit of what Frankfurt had proposed in his seminal work. However, all of these different versions of sufficientarianism suffer from two critical problems: (a) they fail to give right answers to lifeboat situations, and (b) they fail to provide continuous ethical judgments. In this paper, I show a version of utilitarianism that solves these problems while retaining the major attractions of sufficientarianism. I call it “prospect utilitarianism.” In addition, I show that prospect utilitarianism can avoid standard objections to utilitarianism and has aspects that can appeal to both prioritarians and egalitarians as well.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1911-1933
Number of pages23
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume174
Issue number8
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017 Aug 1
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Utilitarianism
Doctrine
Political philosophers
Theorists
Attraction
Equality
Moral Ideals

Keywords

  • Doctrine of Sufficiency
  • Frankfurt
  • Prospect Theory
  • Sufficientarianism
  • Utilitarianism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Prospect utilitarianism : A better alternative to sufficientarianism. / Chung, Hun.

In: Philosophical Studies, Vol. 174, No. 8, 01.08.2017, p. 1911-1933.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Chung, Hun. / Prospect utilitarianism : A better alternative to sufficientarianism. In: Philosophical Studies. 2017 ; Vol. 174, No. 8. pp. 1911-1933.
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