Protection for sale or surge protection?

Susumu Imai, Hajime Katayama, Kala Krishna

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper asks whether the results obtained from using the standard approach to testing the influential Grossman and Helpman "protection for sale" model of political economy might arise from a simpler setting. A model of imports and quotas with protection occurring in response to import surges, but only for organized industries, is simulated and shown to provide parameter estimates consistent with the protection for sale framework. This suggests that the standard approach may be less of a test than previously thought.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)675-688
Number of pages14
JournalEuropean Economic Review
Volume53
Issue number6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2009 Aug
Externally publishedYes

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Import
Industry
Political economy
Testing

Keywords

  • Lobbying
  • Political economy
  • Protection for sale

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

Cite this

Protection for sale or surge protection? / Imai, Susumu; Katayama, Hajime; Krishna, Kala.

In: European Economic Review, Vol. 53, No. 6, 08.2009, p. 675-688.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Imai, Susumu ; Katayama, Hajime ; Krishna, Kala. / Protection for sale or surge protection?. In: European Economic Review. 2009 ; Vol. 53, No. 6. pp. 675-688.
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