Public-goods games with endogenous institution-formation: Experimental evidence on the effect of the voting rule

Yukihiko Funaki; Jiawen Li; Róbert F. Veszteg

doi:10.3390/g8040052

Public-goods games with endogenous institution-formation: Experimental evidence on the effect of the voting rule

Yukihiko Funaki, Jiawen Li, Róbert F. Veszteg

School of Political Science and Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We report experimental results on voluntary contributions to public-goods provision from situations in which parties can create institutions to impose a certain contribution level on its members. We focus on a public-goods game where the joint decisions inside the institution are made based on the plurality voting rule. We show that, comparing to the unanimity voting rule, the plurality rule results in a significant and large decrease in the institution initiation rate, along with a significant and large increase in the institution implementation rate. In the end, as the two effects cancel each other out, the choice of the voting rule does not significantly affect the average contribution level or efficiency.

Original language	English
Article number	52
Journal	Games
Volume	8
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.3390/g8040052
Publication status	Published - 2017 Dec 2

Keywords

Institution formation
Laboratory experiment
Plurality voting
Public-goods game
Unanimity voting

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Statistics and Probability
Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
Applied Mathematics

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10.3390/g8040052

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title = "Public-goods games with endogenous institution-formation: Experimental evidence on the effect of the voting rule",

abstract = "We report experimental results on voluntary contributions to public-goods provision from situations in which parties can create institutions to impose a certain contribution level on its members. We focus on a public-goods game where the joint decisions inside the institution are made based on the plurality voting rule. We show that, comparing to the unanimity voting rule, the plurality rule results in a significant and large decrease in the institution initiation rate, along with a significant and large increase in the institution implementation rate. In the end, as the two effects cancel each other out, the choice of the voting rule does not significantly affect the average contribution level or efficiency.",

keywords = "Institution formation, Laboratory experiment, Plurality voting, Public-goods game, Unanimity voting",

author = "Yukihiko Funaki and Jiawen Li and Veszteg, {R{\'o}bert F.}",

note = "Funding Information: Acknowledgments: This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grants number JP23530231 and JP26380247. JSPS: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. KAKENHI: Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research.",

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N1 - Funding Information: Acknowledgments: This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grants number JP23530231 and JP26380247. JSPS: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. KAKENHI: Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research.

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N2 - We report experimental results on voluntary contributions to public-goods provision from situations in which parties can create institutions to impose a certain contribution level on its members. We focus on a public-goods game where the joint decisions inside the institution are made based on the plurality voting rule. We show that, comparing to the unanimity voting rule, the plurality rule results in a significant and large decrease in the institution initiation rate, along with a significant and large increase in the institution implementation rate. In the end, as the two effects cancel each other out, the choice of the voting rule does not significantly affect the average contribution level or efficiency.

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