Abstract
We report experimental results on voluntary contributions to public-goods provision from situations in which parties can create institutions to impose a certain contribution level on its members. We focus on a public-goods game where the joint decisions inside the institution are made based on the plurality voting rule. We show that, comparing to the unanimity voting rule, the plurality rule results in a significant and large decrease in the institution initiation rate, along with a significant and large increase in the institution implementation rate. In the end, as the two effects cancel each other out, the choice of the voting rule does not significantly affect the average contribution level or efficiency.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 52 |
Journal | Games |
Volume | 8 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2017 Dec 2 |
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Keywords
- Institution formation
- Laboratory experiment
- Plurality voting
- Public-goods game
- Unanimity voting
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Statistics and Probability
- Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
- Applied Mathematics
Cite this
Public-goods games with endogenous institution-formation : Experimental evidence on the effect of the voting rule. / Funaki, Yukihiko; Li, Jiawen; Veszteg, Robert Ferenc.
In: Games, Vol. 8, No. 4, 52, 02.12.2017.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Public-goods games with endogenous institution-formation
T2 - Experimental evidence on the effect of the voting rule
AU - Funaki, Yukihiko
AU - Li, Jiawen
AU - Veszteg, Robert Ferenc
PY - 2017/12/2
Y1 - 2017/12/2
N2 - We report experimental results on voluntary contributions to public-goods provision from situations in which parties can create institutions to impose a certain contribution level on its members. We focus on a public-goods game where the joint decisions inside the institution are made based on the plurality voting rule. We show that, comparing to the unanimity voting rule, the plurality rule results in a significant and large decrease in the institution initiation rate, along with a significant and large increase in the institution implementation rate. In the end, as the two effects cancel each other out, the choice of the voting rule does not significantly affect the average contribution level or efficiency.
AB - We report experimental results on voluntary contributions to public-goods provision from situations in which parties can create institutions to impose a certain contribution level on its members. We focus on a public-goods game where the joint decisions inside the institution are made based on the plurality voting rule. We show that, comparing to the unanimity voting rule, the plurality rule results in a significant and large decrease in the institution initiation rate, along with a significant and large increase in the institution implementation rate. In the end, as the two effects cancel each other out, the choice of the voting rule does not significantly affect the average contribution level or efficiency.
KW - Institution formation
KW - Laboratory experiment
KW - Plurality voting
KW - Public-goods game
KW - Unanimity voting
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85041530049&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85041530049&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.3390/g8040052
DO - 10.3390/g8040052
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85041530049
VL - 8
JO - Games
JF - Games
SN - 2073-4336
IS - 4
M1 - 52
ER -