Real time pricing and pivot mechanism for LQG power networks

Yusuke Okajima, Toshiyuki Murao, Kenji Hirata, Kenko Uchida

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    6 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    We consider a dynamic game model of power networks with generators and/or consumers, called agents, and one public commission, called utility; a game with a prescribed dynamic mechanism is performed such that each agent decides a private control to minimize its own cost functional, and the utility manages information transmissions between the utility and agents and decides command signals, called prices, to minimize a public cost functional. We discuss designs of the mechanism that integrates selfish and strategic determinations of private controls by the agents into the optimal public controls that rational agents can accept. The model considered in this paper is the linear models of power networks, which is a special case of the model so-called average system frequency models, but we also include white Gaussian disturbances in each dynamic model of the agents in order to take account into the stochastic nature of renewable resources. Assuming that each private cost functional as well as the public cost functional is quadratic, we derive explicit formulas of the command signalling scheme, i.e., pricing scheme, and the incentive cost, inspired by the pivot function in the mechanism design theory literate from economics, that characterize our mechanism design in both formulations of the fixed horizon control and the receding horizon control cases.

    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationProceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Control Applications
    PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
    Pages495-500
    Number of pages6
    ISBN (Print)9781479915590
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2013
    Event2013 IEEE International Conference on Control Applications, CCA 2013 - Hyderabad
    Duration: 2013 Aug 282013 Aug 30

    Other

    Other2013 IEEE International Conference on Control Applications, CCA 2013
    CityHyderabad
    Period13/8/2813/8/30

    Fingerprint

    Pivot
    Pricing
    Costs
    Mechanism Design
    Receding Horizon Control
    Renewable Resources
    Minimise
    Dynamic Games
    Dynamic models
    Incentives
    Model
    Explicit Formula
    Horizon
    Linear Model
    Dynamic Model
    Disturbance
    Integrate
    Economics
    Generator
    Game

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Control and Systems Engineering
    • Computer Science Applications
    • Mathematics(all)

    Cite this

    Okajima, Y., Murao, T., Hirata, K., & Uchida, K. (2013). Real time pricing and pivot mechanism for LQG power networks. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Control Applications (pp. 495-500). [6662798] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/CCA.2013.6662798

    Real time pricing and pivot mechanism for LQG power networks. / Okajima, Yusuke; Murao, Toshiyuki; Hirata, Kenji; Uchida, Kenko.

    Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Control Applications. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2013. p. 495-500 6662798.

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Okajima, Y, Murao, T, Hirata, K & Uchida, K 2013, Real time pricing and pivot mechanism for LQG power networks. in Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Control Applications., 6662798, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 495-500, 2013 IEEE International Conference on Control Applications, CCA 2013, Hyderabad, 13/8/28. https://doi.org/10.1109/CCA.2013.6662798
    Okajima Y, Murao T, Hirata K, Uchida K. Real time pricing and pivot mechanism for LQG power networks. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Control Applications. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2013. p. 495-500. 6662798 https://doi.org/10.1109/CCA.2013.6662798
    Okajima, Yusuke ; Murao, Toshiyuki ; Hirata, Kenji ; Uchida, Kenko. / Real time pricing and pivot mechanism for LQG power networks. Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Control Applications. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2013. pp. 495-500
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