Regulating network traffic by exploiting the price elasticity of demand in wireless random access networks

Bo Gu, Cheng Zhang, Kyoko Yamori, Zhenyu Zhou, Song Liu, Yoshiaki Tanaka

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    1 Citation (Scopus)

    Abstract

    In this paper, pricing is adopted as incentive mechanism to encourage users to choose their access probabilities considering the real-time network congestion level in a contentionbased wireless random access network. A Stackelberg leaderfollower game is formulated to analyze the competitive interaction between the service provider and the users. In particular, each user chooses the access probability to optimize its payoff, while the self-interested service provider decides whether to admit or reject the user's connection request in order to optimize its revenue. The stability of the Stackelberg leader-follower game in terms of convergence to the Nash equilibrium is established. The proposed CAC scheme is completely distributed and can be implemented by individual access points using only local information. Compared with the existing schemes, the proposed scheme limits the amount of traffic admitted into the network and achieves higher QoS performance without decreasing the total revenue of the service provider.

    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publication2015 10th Asia-Pacific Symposium on Information and Telecommunication Technologies, APSITT 2015
    PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
    Pages70-72
    Number of pages3
    ISBN (Print)9784885522987
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2015 Aug 20
    Event10th Asia-Pacific Symposium on Information and Telecommunication Technologies, APSITT 2015 - Colombo, Sri Lanka
    Duration: 2015 Aug 42015 Aug 7

    Other

    Other10th Asia-Pacific Symposium on Information and Telecommunication Technologies, APSITT 2015
    CountrySri Lanka
    CityColombo
    Period15/8/415/8/7

    Keywords

    • backward induction
    • CAC
    • pricing
    • Stackelberg game
    • wireless random access network

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Computer Networks and Communications
    • Information Systems

    Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Regulating network traffic by exploiting the price elasticity of demand in wireless random access networks'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this

    Gu, B., Zhang, C., Yamori, K., Zhou, Z., Liu, S., & Tanaka, Y. (2015). Regulating network traffic by exploiting the price elasticity of demand in wireless random access networks. In 2015 10th Asia-Pacific Symposium on Information and Telecommunication Technologies, APSITT 2015 (pp. 70-72). [7217129] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/APSITT.2015.7217129