Robust and secure implementation: Equivalence theorems

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    2 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    This paper shows that in private value environments, strategy-proofness and the rectangular property are necessary conditions for (full) robust implementation (Bergemann and Morris, 2011). As corollaries, we obtain the equivalence between robust and secure implementation (Saijo et al., 2007), the revelation principle for robust implementation, and characterization of double implementation in robust and secure implementation.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)96-101
    Number of pages6
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume86
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2014 Jan 1

    Fingerprint

    Equivalence theorem
    Private values
    Revelation principle
    Strategy-proofness
    Equivalence

    Keywords

    • Full implementation
    • Private values
    • Robust implementation
    • Secure implementation

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Finance

    Cite this

    Robust and secure implementation : Equivalence theorems. / Adachi, Tsuyoshi.

    In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 86, 01.01.2014, p. 96-101.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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