Sample path analysis of contribution and reward in cooperative groups

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Explaining cooperative behavior is one of the major challenges in both biology and human society. The individual reward in cooperative group depends on how we share the rewards in the group. Thus, the group size dynamics in a cooperative group and reward-allocation rule seem essential to evaluate the emergence of cooperative groups. We apply a sample path-based analysis called an extension of Little's formula to general cooperative group. We show that the expected reward is insensitive to the specific reward-allocation rule and probabilistic structure of group dynamics, and the simple productivity condition guarantees the expected reward to be larger than the average contribution. As an example, we take social queues to see the insensitivity result in detail.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)311-314
Number of pages4
JournalJournal of Theoretical Biology
Volume256
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2009 Feb 7

Fingerprint

Path Analysis
Sample Path
Reward
cooperatives
Productivity
sampling
Group Structure
group size
Cooperative Behavior
Insensitivity
Biology
Biological Sciences
Queue
Efficiency
Evaluate

Keywords

  • Altruism
  • Cooperation
  • Little's formula
  • Queueing theory
  • Social queue

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Medicine(all)
  • Immunology and Microbiology(all)
  • Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology(all)
  • Agricultural and Biological Sciences(all)
  • Modelling and Simulation
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Applied Mathematics

Cite this

Sample path analysis of contribution and reward in cooperative groups. / Toyoizumi, Hiroshi.

In: Journal of Theoretical Biology, Vol. 256, No. 3, 07.02.2009, p. 311-314.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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