Scan-based attack on AES through round registers and its countermeasure

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Scan-based side channel attack on hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms has shown its great security threat. Unlike existing scan-based attacks, in our work we observed that instead of the secret-related-registers, some non-secret registers also carry the potential of being misused to help a hacker to retrieve secret keys. In this paper, we first present a scan-based side channel attack method on AES by making use of the round counter registers, which are not paid attention to in previous works, to show the potential security threat in designs with scan chains. And then we discussed the issues of secure DFT requirements and proposed a secure scan scheme to preserve all the advantages and simplicities of traditional scan test, while significantly improve the security with ignorable design overhead, for crypto hardware implementations.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)2338-2346
    Number of pages9
    JournalIEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
    VolumeE95-A
    Issue number12
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2012 Dec

    Fingerprint

    Countermeasures
    Side Channel Attacks
    Attack
    Hardware Implementation
    Hardware
    Discrete Fourier transforms
    Simplicity
    Requirements
    Side channel attack
    Design

    Keywords

    • Crypto implementation
    • Scan-based side channel attack
    • Security
    • Testability

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
    • Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
    • Applied Mathematics
    • Signal Processing

    Cite this

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    abstract = "Scan-based side channel attack on hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms has shown its great security threat. Unlike existing scan-based attacks, in our work we observed that instead of the secret-related-registers, some non-secret registers also carry the potential of being misused to help a hacker to retrieve secret keys. In this paper, we first present a scan-based side channel attack method on AES by making use of the round counter registers, which are not paid attention to in previous works, to show the potential security threat in designs with scan chains. And then we discussed the issues of secure DFT requirements and proposed a secure scan scheme to preserve all the advantages and simplicities of traditional scan test, while significantly improve the security with ignorable design overhead, for crypto hardware implementations.",
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