Abstract
Scan-based side channel attack on hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms has shown its great security threat. Unlike existing scan-based attacks, in our work we observed that instead of the secret-related-registers, some non-secret registers also carry the potential of being misused to help a hacker to retrieve secret keys. In this paper, we first present a scan-based side channel attack method on AES by making use of the round counter registers, which are not paid attention to in previous works, to show the potential security threat in designs with scan chains. And then we discussed the issues of secure DFT requirements and proposed a secure scan scheme to preserve all the advantages and simplicities of traditional scan test, while significantly improve the security with ignorable design overhead, for crypto hardware implementations.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 2338-2346 |
| Number of pages | 9 |
| Journal | IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences |
| Volume | E95-A |
| Issue number | 12 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2012 Dec |
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Keywords
- Crypto implementation
- Scan-based side channel attack
- Security
- Testability
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Electrical and Electronic Engineering
- Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
- Applied Mathematics
- Signal Processing
Cite this
Scan-based attack on AES through round registers and its countermeasure. / Shi, Youhua; Togawa, Nozomu; Yanagisawa, Masao.
In: IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences, Vol. E95-A, No. 12, 12.2012, p. 2338-2346.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Scan-based attack on AES through round registers and its countermeasure
AU - Shi, Youhua
AU - Togawa, Nozomu
AU - Yanagisawa, Masao
PY - 2012/12
Y1 - 2012/12
N2 - Scan-based side channel attack on hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms has shown its great security threat. Unlike existing scan-based attacks, in our work we observed that instead of the secret-related-registers, some non-secret registers also carry the potential of being misused to help a hacker to retrieve secret keys. In this paper, we first present a scan-based side channel attack method on AES by making use of the round counter registers, which are not paid attention to in previous works, to show the potential security threat in designs with scan chains. And then we discussed the issues of secure DFT requirements and proposed a secure scan scheme to preserve all the advantages and simplicities of traditional scan test, while significantly improve the security with ignorable design overhead, for crypto hardware implementations.
AB - Scan-based side channel attack on hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms has shown its great security threat. Unlike existing scan-based attacks, in our work we observed that instead of the secret-related-registers, some non-secret registers also carry the potential of being misused to help a hacker to retrieve secret keys. In this paper, we first present a scan-based side channel attack method on AES by making use of the round counter registers, which are not paid attention to in previous works, to show the potential security threat in designs with scan chains. And then we discussed the issues of secure DFT requirements and proposed a secure scan scheme to preserve all the advantages and simplicities of traditional scan test, while significantly improve the security with ignorable design overhead, for crypto hardware implementations.
KW - Crypto implementation
KW - Scan-based side channel attack
KW - Security
KW - Testability
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U2 - 10.1587/transfun.E95.A.2338
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E95.A.2338
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84870487613
VL - E95-A
SP - 2338
EP - 2346
JO - IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
JF - IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
SN - 0916-8508
IS - 12
ER -