Scan-based side-channel attack on Camellia cipher using scan signatures

Huiqian Hang, Mika Fujishiro, Hirokazu Kodera, Masao Yanagisawa, Nozomu Togawa

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Camellia, a block cipher jointly developed by Mitsubishi and NTT of Japan, is suitable for both software and hardware implementations and more secure than AES cipher. One of design-for-test techniques using scan chains is called scan-path test, in which testers can observe and control registers inside the LSI chip directly. Recently, scan-based side-channel attack is reported which retrieves the secret information from the cryptosystem using scan chains. In this paper, we propose a scan-based attack method on Camellia cipher using scan signatures. Our proposed method is based on equivalent transformation of the Camellia algorithm and key pattern reduction in order to retrieve the secret key. Experimental results show that our proposed method sucessfully retrieves its 128-bit secret key using 960 plaintexts if the scan chain is only connected to the Camellia cipher and also sucessfully retrieves its key on SASEBO-GII, which is a side-channel attack standard evaluation board.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2014 IEEE Asia Pacific Conference on Circuits and Systems, APCCAS 2014
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages252-255
Number of pages4
EditionFebruary
ISBN (Electronic)9781479952304
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015 Feb 5
Event2014 IEEE Asia Pacific Conference on Circuits and Systems, APCCAS 2014 - Ishigaki Island, Okinawa, Japan
Duration: 2014 Nov 172014 Nov 20

Publication series

NameIEEE Asia-Pacific Conference on Circuits and Systems, Proceedings, APCCAS
NumberFebruary
Volume2015-February

Other

Other2014 IEEE Asia Pacific Conference on Circuits and Systems, APCCAS 2014
CountryJapan
CityIshigaki Island, Okinawa
Period14/11/1714/11/20

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Scan-based side-channel attack on Camellia cipher using scan signatures'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this

    Hang, H., Fujishiro, M., Kodera, H., Yanagisawa, M., & Togawa, N. (2015). Scan-based side-channel attack on Camellia cipher using scan signatures. In 2014 IEEE Asia Pacific Conference on Circuits and Systems, APCCAS 2014 (February ed., pp. 252-255). [7032767] (IEEE Asia-Pacific Conference on Circuits and Systems, Proceedings, APCCAS; Vol. 2015-February, No. February). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/APCCAS.2014.7032767