Scan-based side-channel attack on the camellia block cipher using scan signatures

Huiqian Jiang, Mika Fujishiro, Hirokazu Kodera, Masao Yanagisawa, Nozomu Togawa

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    1 Citation (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Camellia is a block cipher jointly developed byMitsubishi and NTT of Japan. It is designed suitable for both software and hardware implementations. One of the design-for-test techniques using scan chains is called scan-path test, in which testers can observe and control the registers inside the LSI chip directly in order to check if the LSI chip correctly operates or not. Recently, a scan-based side-channel attack is reported which retrieves the secret information from the cryptosystem using scan chains. In this paper, we propose a scan-based attack method on the Camellia cipher using scan signatures. Our proposed method is based on the equivalent transformation of the Camellia algorithm and the possible key candidate reduction in order to retrieve the secret key. Experimental results show that our proposed method sucessfully retrieved its 128-bit secret key using 960 plaintexts even if the scan chain includes the Camellia cipher and other circuits and also sucessfully retrieves its secret key on the SASEBO-GII board, which is a side-channel attack standard evaluation board.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)2547-2555
    Number of pages9
    JournalIEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
    VolumeE98A
    Issue number12
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2015 Dec 1

    Fingerprint

    Side Channel Attacks
    Block Cipher
    Signature
    Cryptography
    Chip
    Hardware
    Networks (circuits)
    Cryptosystem
    Hardware Implementation
    Japan
    Attack
    Path
    Software
    Side channel attack
    Evaluation
    Experimental Results

    Keywords

    • Camellia
    • Design-fortest
    • Scan chain
    • Scan signature
    • Scan-based attack
    • Side-channel attack

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
    • Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
    • Applied Mathematics
    • Signal Processing

    Cite this

    Scan-based side-channel attack on the camellia block cipher using scan signatures. / Jiang, Huiqian; Fujishiro, Mika; Kodera, Hirokazu; Yanagisawa, Masao; Togawa, Nozomu.

    In: IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences, Vol. E98A, No. 12, 01.12.2015, p. 2547-2555.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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