Scan-based side-channel attack on the LED block cipher using scan signatures

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    3 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    LED (Light Encryption Device) block cipher, one of lightweight block ciphers, is very compact in hardware. Its encryption process is composed of AES-like rounds. Recently, a scan-based side-channel attack is reported which retrieves the secret information inside the cryptosystem utilizing scan chains, one of design-for-test techniques. In this paper, a scan-based attack method on the LED block cipher using scan signatures is proposed. In our proposed method, we focus on a particular 16-bit position in scanned data obtained from an LED LSI chip and retrieve its secret key using scan signatures. Experimental results show that our proposed method successfully retrieves its 64-bit secret key using 36 plaintexts on average if the scan chain is only connected to the LED block cipher. These experimental results also show the key is successfully retrieved even if the scan chain includes additional 130,000 1-bit data.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)2434-2442
    Number of pages9
    JournalIEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
    VolumeE97A
    Issue number12
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2014 Dec 1

    Fingerprint

    Side Channel Attacks
    Block Cipher
    Encryption
    Cryptography
    Signature
    Block Ciphers
    Experimental Results
    Cryptosystem
    Chip
    Computer hardware
    Attack
    Side channel attack
    Hardware

    Keywords

    • LED
    • Light encryption device
    • Scan chain
    • Scan-based attack
    • Side-channel attacks

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
    • Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
    • Applied Mathematics
    • Signal Processing

    Cite this

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    title = "Scan-based side-channel attack on the LED block cipher using scan signatures",
    abstract = "LED (Light Encryption Device) block cipher, one of lightweight block ciphers, is very compact in hardware. Its encryption process is composed of AES-like rounds. Recently, a scan-based side-channel attack is reported which retrieves the secret information inside the cryptosystem utilizing scan chains, one of design-for-test techniques. In this paper, a scan-based attack method on the LED block cipher using scan signatures is proposed. In our proposed method, we focus on a particular 16-bit position in scanned data obtained from an LED LSI chip and retrieve its secret key using scan signatures. Experimental results show that our proposed method successfully retrieves its 64-bit secret key using 36 plaintexts on average if the scan chain is only connected to the LED block cipher. These experimental results also show the key is successfully retrieved even if the scan chain includes additional 130,000 1-bit data.",
    keywords = "LED, Light encryption device, Scan chain, Scan-based attack, Side-channel attacks",
    author = "Mika Fujishiro and Masao Yanagisawa and Nozomu Togawa",
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    AU - Fujishiro, Mika

    AU - Yanagisawa, Masao

    AU - Togawa, Nozomu

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    N2 - LED (Light Encryption Device) block cipher, one of lightweight block ciphers, is very compact in hardware. Its encryption process is composed of AES-like rounds. Recently, a scan-based side-channel attack is reported which retrieves the secret information inside the cryptosystem utilizing scan chains, one of design-for-test techniques. In this paper, a scan-based attack method on the LED block cipher using scan signatures is proposed. In our proposed method, we focus on a particular 16-bit position in scanned data obtained from an LED LSI chip and retrieve its secret key using scan signatures. Experimental results show that our proposed method successfully retrieves its 64-bit secret key using 36 plaintexts on average if the scan chain is only connected to the LED block cipher. These experimental results also show the key is successfully retrieved even if the scan chain includes additional 130,000 1-bit data.

    AB - LED (Light Encryption Device) block cipher, one of lightweight block ciphers, is very compact in hardware. Its encryption process is composed of AES-like rounds. Recently, a scan-based side-channel attack is reported which retrieves the secret information inside the cryptosystem utilizing scan chains, one of design-for-test techniques. In this paper, a scan-based attack method on the LED block cipher using scan signatures is proposed. In our proposed method, we focus on a particular 16-bit position in scanned data obtained from an LED LSI chip and retrieve its secret key using scan signatures. Experimental results show that our proposed method successfully retrieves its 64-bit secret key using 36 plaintexts on average if the scan chain is only connected to the LED block cipher. These experimental results also show the key is successfully retrieved even if the scan chain includes additional 130,000 1-bit data.

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    KW - Side-channel attacks

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