Abstract
We study strategy-proof allocation rules in economies with perfectly divisible multiple commodities and single-peaked preferences. In this setup, it is known that the incompatibility among strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency and non-dictatorship arises in contrast with the Sprumont (Econometrica 59:509-519, 1991) one commodity model. We first investigate the existence problem of strategy-proof and second-best efficient rules, where a strategy-proof rule is second-best efficient if it is not Pareto-dominated by any other strategy-proof rules. We show that there exists an egalitarian rational (consequently, non-dictatorial) strategy-proof rule satisfying second-best efficiency. Second, we give a new characterization of the generalized uniform rule with the second-best efficiency in two-agent case.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 693-716 |
Number of pages | 24 |
Journal | Economic Theory |
Volume | 54 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2013 Jan 1 |
Keywords
- Generalized uniform rule
- Second-best efficiency
- Single-peaked preference
- Strategy-proofness
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics