Abstract
We study strategy-proof allocation rules in economies with perfectly divisible multiple commodities and single-peaked preferences. In this setup, it is known that the incompatibility among strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency and non-dictatorship arises in contrast with the Sprumont (Econometrica 59:509-519, 1991) one commodity model. We first investigate the existence problem of strategy-proof and second-best efficient rules, where a strategy-proof rule is second-best efficient if it is not Pareto-dominated by any other strategy-proof rules. We show that there exists an egalitarian rational (consequently, non-dictatorial) strategy-proof rule satisfying second-best efficiency. Second, we give a new characterization of the generalized uniform rule with the second-best efficiency in two-agent case.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 693-716 |
| Number of pages | 24 |
| Journal | Economic Theory |
| Volume | 54 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2013 |
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Keywords
- Generalized uniform rule
- Second-best efficiency
- Single-peaked preference
- Strategy-proofness
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
Cite this
Second-best efficiency of allocation rules : Strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities. / Anno, Hidekazu; Sasaki, Hiroo.
In: Economic Theory, Vol. 54, No. 3, 2013, p. 693-716.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Second-best efficiency of allocation rules
T2 - Strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities
AU - Anno, Hidekazu
AU - Sasaki, Hiroo
PY - 2013
Y1 - 2013
N2 - We study strategy-proof allocation rules in economies with perfectly divisible multiple commodities and single-peaked preferences. In this setup, it is known that the incompatibility among strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency and non-dictatorship arises in contrast with the Sprumont (Econometrica 59:509-519, 1991) one commodity model. We first investigate the existence problem of strategy-proof and second-best efficient rules, where a strategy-proof rule is second-best efficient if it is not Pareto-dominated by any other strategy-proof rules. We show that there exists an egalitarian rational (consequently, non-dictatorial) strategy-proof rule satisfying second-best efficiency. Second, we give a new characterization of the generalized uniform rule with the second-best efficiency in two-agent case.
AB - We study strategy-proof allocation rules in economies with perfectly divisible multiple commodities and single-peaked preferences. In this setup, it is known that the incompatibility among strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency and non-dictatorship arises in contrast with the Sprumont (Econometrica 59:509-519, 1991) one commodity model. We first investigate the existence problem of strategy-proof and second-best efficient rules, where a strategy-proof rule is second-best efficient if it is not Pareto-dominated by any other strategy-proof rules. We show that there exists an egalitarian rational (consequently, non-dictatorial) strategy-proof rule satisfying second-best efficiency. Second, we give a new characterization of the generalized uniform rule with the second-best efficiency in two-agent case.
KW - Generalized uniform rule
KW - Second-best efficiency
KW - Single-peaked preference
KW - Strategy-proofness
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84891146439&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84891146439&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s00199-012-0732-0
DO - 10.1007/s00199-012-0732-0
M3 - Article
VL - 54
SP - 693
EP - 716
JO - Economic Theory
JF - Economic Theory
SN - 0938-2259
IS - 3
ER -