TY - JOUR
T1 - Second-best efficiency of allocation rules
T2 - Strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities
AU - Anno, Hidekazu
AU - Sasaki, Hiroo
N1 - Funding Information:
This paper is based on Anno (, ) and Sasaki (). We would like to thank Takashi Akahoshi, Pablo Amorós, Miguel A.Ballester, Salvador Barberà, Matthew Jackson, Ricardo Martinez, Jordi Massó, Akio Kagawa, Yoichi Kasajima, Kohei Kawamura, Manipushpak Mitra, Bernardo Moreno, Shuhei Morimoto, Hervé Moulin, Clemens Puppe, Toyotaka Sakai, Ken Sawada, Tadashi Sekiguchi, Shigehiro Serizawa, Koichi Tadenuma, William Thomson, Takuma Wakayama, Nobuya Watanabe and Naoki Yoshihara. We would also like to thank an associate editor of this journal and two anonymous referees. Their comments are very helpful for improving the paper. Anno acknowledges the financial support by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Research Fellowships. Sasaki’s research is supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research (No. 19530162).
PY - 2013/11
Y1 - 2013/11
N2 - We study strategy-proof allocation rules in economies with perfectly divisible multiple commodities and single-peaked preferences. In this setup, it is known that the incompatibility among strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency and non-dictatorship arises in contrast with the Sprumont (Econometrica 59:509-519, 1991) one commodity model. We first investigate the existence problem of strategy-proof and second-best efficient rules, where a strategy-proof rule is second-best efficient if it is not Pareto-dominated by any other strategy-proof rules. We show that there exists an egalitarian rational (consequently, non-dictatorial) strategy-proof rule satisfying second-best efficiency. Second, we give a new characterization of the generalized uniform rule with the second-best efficiency in two-agent case.
AB - We study strategy-proof allocation rules in economies with perfectly divisible multiple commodities and single-peaked preferences. In this setup, it is known that the incompatibility among strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency and non-dictatorship arises in contrast with the Sprumont (Econometrica 59:509-519, 1991) one commodity model. We first investigate the existence problem of strategy-proof and second-best efficient rules, where a strategy-proof rule is second-best efficient if it is not Pareto-dominated by any other strategy-proof rules. We show that there exists an egalitarian rational (consequently, non-dictatorial) strategy-proof rule satisfying second-best efficiency. Second, we give a new characterization of the generalized uniform rule with the second-best efficiency in two-agent case.
KW - Generalized uniform rule
KW - Second-best efficiency
KW - Single-peaked preference
KW - Strategy-proofness
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U2 - 10.1007/s00199-012-0732-0
DO - 10.1007/s00199-012-0732-0
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84891146439
VL - 54
SP - 693
EP - 716
JO - Economic Theory
JF - Economic Theory
SN - 0938-2259
IS - 3
ER -