Second-best efficiency of allocation rules

Strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities

Hidekazu Anno, Hiroo Sasaki

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study strategy-proof allocation rules in economies with perfectly divisible multiple commodities and single-peaked preferences. In this setup, it is known that the incompatibility among strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency and non-dictatorship arises in contrast with the Sprumont (Econometrica 59:509-519, 1991) one commodity model. We first investigate the existence problem of strategy-proof and second-best efficient rules, where a strategy-proof rule is second-best efficient if it is not Pareto-dominated by any other strategy-proof rules. We show that there exists an egalitarian rational (consequently, non-dictatorial) strategy-proof rule satisfying second-best efficiency. Second, we give a new characterization of the generalized uniform rule with the second-best efficiency in two-agent case.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)693-716
Number of pages24
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume54
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013

Fingerprint

Strategy-proof
Strategy-proofness
Allocation rules
Commodities
Single-peaked preferences
Pareto
Uniform rule
Pareto efficiency
Incompatibility

Keywords

  • Generalized uniform rule
  • Second-best efficiency
  • Single-peaked preference
  • Strategy-proofness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Second-best efficiency of allocation rules : Strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities. / Anno, Hidekazu; Sasaki, Hiroo.

In: Economic Theory, Vol. 54, No. 3, 2013, p. 693-716.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{3f5d1a42456749efb7513a310a77ea07,
title = "Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: Strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities",
abstract = "We study strategy-proof allocation rules in economies with perfectly divisible multiple commodities and single-peaked preferences. In this setup, it is known that the incompatibility among strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency and non-dictatorship arises in contrast with the Sprumont (Econometrica 59:509-519, 1991) one commodity model. We first investigate the existence problem of strategy-proof and second-best efficient rules, where a strategy-proof rule is second-best efficient if it is not Pareto-dominated by any other strategy-proof rules. We show that there exists an egalitarian rational (consequently, non-dictatorial) strategy-proof rule satisfying second-best efficiency. Second, we give a new characterization of the generalized uniform rule with the second-best efficiency in two-agent case.",
keywords = "Generalized uniform rule, Second-best efficiency, Single-peaked preference, Strategy-proofness",
author = "Hidekazu Anno and Hiroo Sasaki",
year = "2013",
doi = "10.1007/s00199-012-0732-0",
language = "English",
volume = "54",
pages = "693--716",
journal = "Economic Theory",
issn = "0938-2259",
publisher = "Springer New York",
number = "3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Second-best efficiency of allocation rules

T2 - Strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities

AU - Anno, Hidekazu

AU - Sasaki, Hiroo

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - We study strategy-proof allocation rules in economies with perfectly divisible multiple commodities and single-peaked preferences. In this setup, it is known that the incompatibility among strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency and non-dictatorship arises in contrast with the Sprumont (Econometrica 59:509-519, 1991) one commodity model. We first investigate the existence problem of strategy-proof and second-best efficient rules, where a strategy-proof rule is second-best efficient if it is not Pareto-dominated by any other strategy-proof rules. We show that there exists an egalitarian rational (consequently, non-dictatorial) strategy-proof rule satisfying second-best efficiency. Second, we give a new characterization of the generalized uniform rule with the second-best efficiency in two-agent case.

AB - We study strategy-proof allocation rules in economies with perfectly divisible multiple commodities and single-peaked preferences. In this setup, it is known that the incompatibility among strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency and non-dictatorship arises in contrast with the Sprumont (Econometrica 59:509-519, 1991) one commodity model. We first investigate the existence problem of strategy-proof and second-best efficient rules, where a strategy-proof rule is second-best efficient if it is not Pareto-dominated by any other strategy-proof rules. We show that there exists an egalitarian rational (consequently, non-dictatorial) strategy-proof rule satisfying second-best efficiency. Second, we give a new characterization of the generalized uniform rule with the second-best efficiency in two-agent case.

KW - Generalized uniform rule

KW - Second-best efficiency

KW - Single-peaked preference

KW - Strategy-proofness

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84891146439&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84891146439&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s00199-012-0732-0

DO - 10.1007/s00199-012-0732-0

M3 - Article

VL - 54

SP - 693

EP - 716

JO - Economic Theory

JF - Economic Theory

SN - 0938-2259

IS - 3

ER -