Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: Strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities

Hidekazu Anno, Hiroo Sasaki

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study strategy-proof allocation rules in economies with perfectly divisible multiple commodities and single-peaked preferences. In this setup, it is known that the incompatibility among strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency and non-dictatorship arises in contrast with the Sprumont (Econometrica 59:509-519, 1991) one commodity model. We first investigate the existence problem of strategy-proof and second-best efficient rules, where a strategy-proof rule is second-best efficient if it is not Pareto-dominated by any other strategy-proof rules. We show that there exists an egalitarian rational (consequently, non-dictatorial) strategy-proof rule satisfying second-best efficiency. Second, we give a new characterization of the generalized uniform rule with the second-best efficiency in two-agent case.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)693-716
Number of pages24
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume54
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013

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Keywords

  • Generalized uniform rule
  • Second-best efficiency
  • Single-peaked preference
  • Strategy-proofness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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