Simple but Efficient Collaboration in a Complex Competitive Situation

Satoshi Kurihara, Kensuke Fukuda, Toshio Hirotsu, Osamu Akashi, Shinya Sato, Toshiharu Sugawara

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze a simple adaptive model of competition called the Minority Game, which is used in analyzing competitive phenomena in markets, and suggest that the core elements required for the formation of self-organization are: (i) rules that place a good constraint on each agent's behavior, and (ii) rules that lead to indirect coordination, which is called "stigmergy." Finally, we tested the points suggested by this research in solving the El Farol's bar problem, which is an extended version of the Minority Game.

Original languageEnglish
Pages1042-1043
Number of pages2
Publication statusPublished - 2003 Dec 1
Externally publishedYes
EventProceedings of the Second International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 03 - Melbourne, Vic., Australia
Duration: 2003 Jul 142003 Jul 18

Conference

ConferenceProceedings of the Second International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 03
CountryAustralia
CityMelbourne, Vic.
Period03/7/1403/7/18

Keywords

  • Minority Game
  • Multi-agent
  • Self-organization
  • Stigmergy

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Engineering(all)

Cite this

Kurihara, S., Fukuda, K., Hirotsu, T., Akashi, O., Sato, S., & Sugawara, T. (2003). Simple but Efficient Collaboration in a Complex Competitive Situation. 1042-1043. Paper presented at Proceedings of the Second International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 03, Melbourne, Vic., Australia.