Simple negotiating agents in complex games

Emergent equilibria and dominance of strategies

Peyman Faratin, Mark Klein, Hiroki Sayama, Yaneer Bar-Yam

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We present a simple model of distributed multi-agent multi-issued contract negotiation for open systems where interactions are competitive and information is private and not shared.We then investigate via simulations two different approximate optimization strategies and quantify the contribution and costs of each towards the quality of the solutions reached. To evaluate the role of knowledge the obtained results are compared to more cooperative strategies where agents share more information. Interesting social dilemmas emerge that suggest the design of incentive mechanisms.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationIntelligent Agents VIII
Subtitle of host publicationAgent Theories, Architectures, and Languages - 8th International Workshop, ATAL 2001, Revised Papers
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages367-376
Number of pages10
Volume2333 LNAI
ISBN (Print)3540438580, 9783540438588
Publication statusPublished - 2002
Externally publishedYes
Event8th International Workshop on Intelligent Agents VIII: Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages, ATAL 2001 - Seattle, WA, United States
Duration: 2001 Aug 12001 Aug 3

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume2333 LNAI
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Other

Other8th International Workshop on Intelligent Agents VIII: Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages, ATAL 2001
CountryUnited States
CitySeattle, WA
Period01/8/101/8/3

Fingerprint

Open systems
Social Dilemma
Game
Incentive Mechanism
Open Systems
Costs
Quantify
Optimization
Evaluate
Interaction
Simulation
Strategy
Model
Knowledge
Design

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

Cite this

Faratin, P., Klein, M., Sayama, H., & Bar-Yam, Y. (2002). Simple negotiating agents in complex games: Emergent equilibria and dominance of strategies. In Intelligent Agents VIII: Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages - 8th International Workshop, ATAL 2001, Revised Papers (Vol. 2333 LNAI, pp. 367-376). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 2333 LNAI). Springer Verlag.

Simple negotiating agents in complex games : Emergent equilibria and dominance of strategies. / Faratin, Peyman; Klein, Mark; Sayama, Hiroki; Bar-Yam, Yaneer.

Intelligent Agents VIII: Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages - 8th International Workshop, ATAL 2001, Revised Papers. Vol. 2333 LNAI Springer Verlag, 2002. p. 367-376 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 2333 LNAI).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Faratin, P, Klein, M, Sayama, H & Bar-Yam, Y 2002, Simple negotiating agents in complex games: Emergent equilibria and dominance of strategies. in Intelligent Agents VIII: Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages - 8th International Workshop, ATAL 2001, Revised Papers. vol. 2333 LNAI, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 2333 LNAI, Springer Verlag, pp. 367-376, 8th International Workshop on Intelligent Agents VIII: Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages, ATAL 2001, Seattle, WA, United States, 01/8/1.
Faratin P, Klein M, Sayama H, Bar-Yam Y. Simple negotiating agents in complex games: Emergent equilibria and dominance of strategies. In Intelligent Agents VIII: Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages - 8th International Workshop, ATAL 2001, Revised Papers. Vol. 2333 LNAI. Springer Verlag. 2002. p. 367-376. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).
Faratin, Peyman ; Klein, Mark ; Sayama, Hiroki ; Bar-Yam, Yaneer. / Simple negotiating agents in complex games : Emergent equilibria and dominance of strategies. Intelligent Agents VIII: Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages - 8th International Workshop, ATAL 2001, Revised Papers. Vol. 2333 LNAI Springer Verlag, 2002. pp. 367-376 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).
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