Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems

Takashi Akahoshi

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    1 Citation (Scopus)

    Abstract

    We explore two necessary and sufficient conditions for the singleton core in college admissions problems. One is a condition on the colleges' preference profiles, called acyclicity, and the other is a condition on their capacity vectors. We also study the implications of our acyclicity condition. The student-optimal stable matching is strongly efficient for the students, given an acyclic profile of the colleges' preference relations. Even when the colleges' true preference profile is acyclic, a college may be better off by misreporting its preference when the college-optimal stable mechanism is used.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)7-13
    Number of pages7
    JournalMathematical Social Sciences
    Volume72
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2014 Nov 1

    Fingerprint

    Many to one
    Matching Problem
    Acyclicity
    Students
    Stable Matching
    Preference Relation
    Necessary Conditions
    Sufficient Conditions
    Profile
    Matching problem
    student

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
    • Social Sciences(all)
    • Psychology(all)
    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems. / Akahoshi, Takashi.

    In: Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 72, 01.11.2014, p. 7-13.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Akahoshi, Takashi. / Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems. In: Mathematical Social Sciences. 2014 ; Vol. 72. pp. 7-13.
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