Some remarks on the folk theorem in game theory

Mamoru Kaneko

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

20 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

It is argued that although the pathological multiplicity of Nash equilibria of super games stated by the folk theorem can be removed by introducing limited observations into super games with a continuum of players, the consideration of super games in terms of the Nash equilibrium concept involves a more fundamental and conceptual difficulty.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)281-290
Number of pages10
JournalMathematical Social Sciences
Volume3
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1982
Externally publishedYes

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Keywords

  • Nash equilibrium
  • observation structure
  • super game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
  • Economics and Econometrics

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