Some remarks on the folk theorem in game theory

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

20 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

It is argued that although the pathological multiplicity of Nash equilibria of super games stated by the folk theorem can be removed by introducing limited observations into super games with a continuum of players, the consideration of super games in terms of the Nash equilibrium concept involves a more fundamental and conceptual difficulty.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)281-290
Number of pages10
JournalMathematical Social Sciences
Volume3
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1982
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Folk Theorem
Game Theory
game theory
Game
Nash Equilibrium
Multiplicity
Continuum
Game theory
Folk theorem
Nash equilibrium

Keywords

  • Nash equilibrium
  • observation structure
  • super game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Some remarks on the folk theorem in game theory. / Kaneko, Mamoru.

In: Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1982, p. 281-290.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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