Stability and values for games with coalition structures

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Casajus (2008) established a link between coalition formation in hedonic games and players’ preferences over coalition structures. He showed that if a value concept for games with coalition structures (a CS-value) satisfies the splitting property and the aggregate component independence property, then the CS-value induces a hedonic game satisfying the common ranking property and yields a nonempty core. The following question was left open: What CS-values induce a hedonic game that does not satisfy the common ranking property but has a nonempty core? In this paper, we offer a set of properties that induces a hedonic game satisfying the top-coalition property, which is less demanding than the common ranking property but generates a nonempty core.

Original languageEnglish
Article number109750
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume200
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2021 Mar

Keywords

  • Coalition formation
  • Core
  • Hedonic games
  • Stability

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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