Stable coalition structures in symmetric majority games: a coincidence between myopia and farsightedness

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to study stable coalition structures in symmetric majority games. We assume that players deviate from a coalition structure to another to maximize their power given by the Owen power index. We introduce three myopic core concepts and one farsighted stability concept, the farsighted vNM stable set. Our main result is that the pessimistic core, the largest myopic core, coincides with some farsighted vNM stable set for any number of players. Moreover, we show that a coalition structure belongs to the pessimistic core and the farsighted vNM stable set if and only if it contains an exact majority coalition.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)353-374
Number of pages22
JournalTheory and Decision
Volume85
Issue number3-4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018 Oct 1

Keywords

  • Coalition structure
  • Farsightedness
  • Myopia
  • Symmetric majority game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Decision Sciences(all)
  • Developmental and Educational Psychology
  • Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
  • Applied Psychology
  • Social Sciences(all)
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
  • Computer Science Applications

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