Stable coalition structures under restricted coalitional changes

Yukihiko Funaki, Takehiko Yamato

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    2 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    In this paper, we examine whether farsighted players form the efficient grand coalition structure in coalition formation games. We propose a stability concept for a coalition structure, called sequentially stability, when only bilateral mergers of two separate coalitions are feasible because of high negotiation costs. We provide an algorithm to check the sequential stability of the grand coalition structure as well as sufficient conditions for which the efficient grand coalition structure is sequentially stable. We also illustrate out results by means of common pool resource games and Cournot oligopoly games.

    Original languageEnglish
    Article number1450006
    JournalInternational Game Theory Review
    Volume16
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2014

    Fingerprint

    Coalitions
    Game
    Coalition Formation
    Oligopoly
    Mergers
    Coalition structure
    Costs
    Resources
    Sufficient Conditions

    Keywords

    • Coalition formation
    • common pool resource
    • Cournot oligopoly
    • farsighted players
    • stability

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
    • Computer Science(all)
    • Business and International Management

    Cite this

    Stable coalition structures under restricted coalitional changes. / Funaki, Yukihiko; Yamato, Takehiko.

    In: International Game Theory Review, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1450006, 2014.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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