Strategic Ambiguity with Probabilistic Voting

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Political parties and candidates usually prefer making ambiguous promises. This study identifies the conditions under which candidates choose ambiguous promises in equilibrium, given convex utility functions of voters. The results show that in a deterministic model, no equilibrium exists when voters have convex utility functions. However, in a probabilistic voting model, candidates make ambiguous promises in equilibrium when (i) voters have convex utility functions, and (ii) the distribution of voters’ most preferred policies is polarized. JEL Classification: D71, D72.

Original languageEnglish
JournalJournal of Theoretical Politics
DOIs
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 2019 Jan 1

Fingerprint

voting
candidacy

Keywords

  • Campaign platform
  • Elections
  • Polarization
  • Political ambiguity
  • Probabilistic voting
  • Public promise

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

Strategic Ambiguity with Probabilistic Voting. / Asako, Yasushi.

In: Journal of Theoretical Politics, 01.01.2019.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{71a63d5a2cae472f8141d5f9738d3a8f,
title = "Strategic Ambiguity with Probabilistic Voting",
abstract = "Political parties and candidates usually prefer making ambiguous promises. This study identifies the conditions under which candidates choose ambiguous promises in equilibrium, given convex utility functions of voters. The results show that in a deterministic model, no equilibrium exists when voters have convex utility functions. However, in a probabilistic voting model, candidates make ambiguous promises in equilibrium when (i) voters have convex utility functions, and (ii) the distribution of voters’ most preferred policies is polarized. JEL Classification: D71, D72.",
keywords = "Campaign platform, Elections, Polarization, Political ambiguity, Probabilistic voting, Public promise",
author = "Yasushi Asako",
year = "2019",
month = "1",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1177/0951629819875516",
language = "English",
journal = "Journal of Theoretical Politics",
issn = "0951-6298",
publisher = "SAGE Publications Ltd",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Strategic Ambiguity with Probabilistic Voting

AU - Asako, Yasushi

PY - 2019/1/1

Y1 - 2019/1/1

N2 - Political parties and candidates usually prefer making ambiguous promises. This study identifies the conditions under which candidates choose ambiguous promises in equilibrium, given convex utility functions of voters. The results show that in a deterministic model, no equilibrium exists when voters have convex utility functions. However, in a probabilistic voting model, candidates make ambiguous promises in equilibrium when (i) voters have convex utility functions, and (ii) the distribution of voters’ most preferred policies is polarized. JEL Classification: D71, D72.

AB - Political parties and candidates usually prefer making ambiguous promises. This study identifies the conditions under which candidates choose ambiguous promises in equilibrium, given convex utility functions of voters. The results show that in a deterministic model, no equilibrium exists when voters have convex utility functions. However, in a probabilistic voting model, candidates make ambiguous promises in equilibrium when (i) voters have convex utility functions, and (ii) the distribution of voters’ most preferred policies is polarized. JEL Classification: D71, D72.

KW - Campaign platform

KW - Elections

KW - Polarization

KW - Political ambiguity

KW - Probabilistic voting

KW - Public promise

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85073918192&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85073918192&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1177/0951629819875516

DO - 10.1177/0951629819875516

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85073918192

JO - Journal of Theoretical Politics

JF - Journal of Theoretical Politics

SN - 0951-6298

ER -