Strategic behavior and market power of aggregators in energy demand networks

Yusuke Okajima, Kenji Hirata, Toshiyuki Murao, Takeshi Hatanaka, Vijay Gupta, Kenko Uchida

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    5 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    This paper considers optimization problems of energy demand networks including aggregators and investigates strategic behavior of the aggregators. The energy demand network including aggregators will be optimized through pricing. Under this optimization process, the aggregator acts as intermediate between energy supply sources and a large number of consumers and is expected to moderate tasks to solve a large scale optimization problem. We propose an optimization process that uses information exchange or aggregation by the aggregators, which is actually an intermediate model of the well-known two extremal models. From the consumer's point of view, the aggregator is expected to have enough negotiation power on behalf of the consumers. This will be a main theme of this paper and we investigate strategic behavior of the aggregators. We suppose that the aggregator will try to pursue the benefit as well as market power by choosing the design parameter in its cost function. The strategic decision making by the aggregators could provide useful insights in qualitative analysis of the energy demand network, and the results of numerical example indicate that, for example, oligopoly by the aggregator may not be beneficial to the consumers.

    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publication2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2017
    PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
    Pages694-701
    Number of pages8
    Volume2018-January
    ISBN (Electronic)9781509028733
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2018 Jan 18
    Event56th IEEE Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2017 - Melbourne, Australia
    Duration: 2017 Dec 122017 Dec 15

    Other

    Other56th IEEE Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2017
    CountryAustralia
    CityMelbourne
    Period17/12/1217/12/15

    Fingerprint

    Process Optimization
    Energy
    Optimization Problem
    Oligopoly
    Large-scale Optimization
    Information use
    Large-scale Problems
    Qualitative Analysis
    Parameter Design
    Cost functions
    Pricing
    Cost Function
    Aggregation
    Agglomeration
    Decision making
    Decision Making
    Numerical Examples
    Market
    Demand
    Energy demand

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Decision Sciences (miscellaneous)
    • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
    • Control and Optimization

    Cite this

    Okajima, Y., Hirata, K., Murao, T., Hatanaka, T., Gupta, V., & Uchida, K. (2018). Strategic behavior and market power of aggregators in energy demand networks. In 2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2017 (Vol. 2018-January, pp. 694-701). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2017.8263742

    Strategic behavior and market power of aggregators in energy demand networks. / Okajima, Yusuke; Hirata, Kenji; Murao, Toshiyuki; Hatanaka, Takeshi; Gupta, Vijay; Uchida, Kenko.

    2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2017. Vol. 2018-January Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2018. p. 694-701.

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Okajima, Y, Hirata, K, Murao, T, Hatanaka, T, Gupta, V & Uchida, K 2018, Strategic behavior and market power of aggregators in energy demand networks. in 2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2017. vol. 2018-January, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 694-701, 56th IEEE Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2017, Melbourne, Australia, 17/12/12. https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2017.8263742
    Okajima Y, Hirata K, Murao T, Hatanaka T, Gupta V, Uchida K. Strategic behavior and market power of aggregators in energy demand networks. In 2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2017. Vol. 2018-January. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2018. p. 694-701 https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2017.8263742
    Okajima, Yusuke ; Hirata, Kenji ; Murao, Toshiyuki ; Hatanaka, Takeshi ; Gupta, Vijay ; Uchida, Kenko. / Strategic behavior and market power of aggregators in energy demand networks. 2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2017. Vol. 2018-January Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2018. pp. 694-701
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