Strategic bidding of private information for principal-agent type dynamic LQ networks

Yasuaki Wasa, Toshiyuki Murao, Takashi Tanaka, Kenko Uchida

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

In this paper, focusing on agents' strategic behavior in their private information utilization, we formulate two types of strategic bidding problems for a simple dynamic principal-agent type linear quadratic (LQ) network where a principal integrates agents' individual controls into the socially optimal one based on information bid by the agents. One is the case that all the agents minimize their own cost, which is undesirable for the principal. The other is an equilibrium in the presence of the incentive design motivated by the standard contract theory to reduce the wasteful social cost. Then we analytically derive optimal designs of strategic bidding for each type and discuss their implications and implementations.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2019 18th European Control Conference, ECC 2019
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages3383-3389
Number of pages7
ISBN (Electronic)9783907144008
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019 Jun 1
Event18th European Control Conference, ECC 2019 - Naples, Italy
Duration: 2019 Jun 252019 Jun 28

Publication series

Name2019 18th European Control Conference, ECC 2019

Conference

Conference18th European Control Conference, ECC 2019
CountryItaly
CityNaples
Period19/6/2519/6/28

Fingerprint

Private Information
Bidding
costs
incentives
Costs
Incentives
Integrate
Minimise

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Instrumentation
  • Control and Optimization

Cite this

Wasa, Y., Murao, T., Tanaka, T., & Uchida, K. (2019). Strategic bidding of private information for principal-agent type dynamic LQ networks. In 2019 18th European Control Conference, ECC 2019 (pp. 3383-3389). [8796002] (2019 18th European Control Conference, ECC 2019). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.23919/ECC.2019.8796002

Strategic bidding of private information for principal-agent type dynamic LQ networks. / Wasa, Yasuaki; Murao, Toshiyuki; Tanaka, Takashi; Uchida, Kenko.

2019 18th European Control Conference, ECC 2019. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2019. p. 3383-3389 8796002 (2019 18th European Control Conference, ECC 2019).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Wasa, Y, Murao, T, Tanaka, T & Uchida, K 2019, Strategic bidding of private information for principal-agent type dynamic LQ networks. in 2019 18th European Control Conference, ECC 2019., 8796002, 2019 18th European Control Conference, ECC 2019, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 3383-3389, 18th European Control Conference, ECC 2019, Naples, Italy, 19/6/25. https://doi.org/10.23919/ECC.2019.8796002
Wasa Y, Murao T, Tanaka T, Uchida K. Strategic bidding of private information for principal-agent type dynamic LQ networks. In 2019 18th European Control Conference, ECC 2019. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2019. p. 3383-3389. 8796002. (2019 18th European Control Conference, ECC 2019). https://doi.org/10.23919/ECC.2019.8796002
Wasa, Yasuaki ; Murao, Toshiyuki ; Tanaka, Takashi ; Uchida, Kenko. / Strategic bidding of private information for principal-agent type dynamic LQ networks. 2019 18th European Control Conference, ECC 2019. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2019. pp. 3383-3389 (2019 18th European Control Conference, ECC 2019).
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