Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: Comparison of centralized punishment institutions

Y. Kamijo, T. Nihonsugi, A. Takeuchi, Yukihiko Funaki

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    9 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    This study investigates two centralized punishment institutions for a linear public goods game. These institutions require a certain contribution level and sanction under-contributing players. The two differ in who, among those who do not meet this requirement, receive sanctions. In one institution, all violators are sanctioned, and in the other, only the worst violator(s) is sanctioned. Theoretically, the public goods game of the latter institution yields contributions equal to or greater than that of the former institution with the same requirement and sanction level. The results of an experiment support this theoretical prediction. However, there is a discrepancy between the theory and laboratory observations in that the institution with the theoretically optimal requirement did not yield the highest profit.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)180-195
    Number of pages16
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume84
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2014 Mar

    Fingerprint

    Sanctions
    Social dilemma
    Punishment
    Discrepancy
    Prediction
    Profit
    Experiment

    Keywords

    • Laboratory experiment
    • Linear public goods game
    • Punishment institutions
    • Sanction

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Finance

    Cite this

    Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas : Comparison of centralized punishment institutions. / Kamijo, Y.; Nihonsugi, T.; Takeuchi, A.; Funaki, Yukihiko.

    In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 84, 03.2014, p. 180-195.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    @article{00856d85ff5c48f3b13be6de03b9810d,
    title = "Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: Comparison of centralized punishment institutions",
    abstract = "This study investigates two centralized punishment institutions for a linear public goods game. These institutions require a certain contribution level and sanction under-contributing players. The two differ in who, among those who do not meet this requirement, receive sanctions. In one institution, all violators are sanctioned, and in the other, only the worst violator(s) is sanctioned. Theoretically, the public goods game of the latter institution yields contributions equal to or greater than that of the former institution with the same requirement and sanction level. The results of an experiment support this theoretical prediction. However, there is a discrepancy between the theory and laboratory observations in that the institution with the theoretically optimal requirement did not yield the highest profit.",
    keywords = "Laboratory experiment, Linear public goods game, Punishment institutions, Sanction",
    author = "Y. Kamijo and T. Nihonsugi and A. Takeuchi and Yukihiko Funaki",
    year = "2014",
    month = "3",
    doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.002",
    language = "English",
    volume = "84",
    pages = "180--195",
    journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
    issn = "0899-8256",
    publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

    }

    TY - JOUR

    T1 - Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas

    T2 - Comparison of centralized punishment institutions

    AU - Kamijo, Y.

    AU - Nihonsugi, T.

    AU - Takeuchi, A.

    AU - Funaki, Yukihiko

    PY - 2014/3

    Y1 - 2014/3

    N2 - This study investigates two centralized punishment institutions for a linear public goods game. These institutions require a certain contribution level and sanction under-contributing players. The two differ in who, among those who do not meet this requirement, receive sanctions. In one institution, all violators are sanctioned, and in the other, only the worst violator(s) is sanctioned. Theoretically, the public goods game of the latter institution yields contributions equal to or greater than that of the former institution with the same requirement and sanction level. The results of an experiment support this theoretical prediction. However, there is a discrepancy between the theory and laboratory observations in that the institution with the theoretically optimal requirement did not yield the highest profit.

    AB - This study investigates two centralized punishment institutions for a linear public goods game. These institutions require a certain contribution level and sanction under-contributing players. The two differ in who, among those who do not meet this requirement, receive sanctions. In one institution, all violators are sanctioned, and in the other, only the worst violator(s) is sanctioned. Theoretically, the public goods game of the latter institution yields contributions equal to or greater than that of the former institution with the same requirement and sanction level. The results of an experiment support this theoretical prediction. However, there is a discrepancy between the theory and laboratory observations in that the institution with the theoretically optimal requirement did not yield the highest profit.

    KW - Laboratory experiment

    KW - Linear public goods game

    KW - Punishment institutions

    KW - Sanction

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84893861626&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84893861626&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.002

    DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.002

    M3 - Article

    AN - SCOPUS:84893861626

    VL - 84

    SP - 180

    EP - 195

    JO - Games and Economic Behavior

    JF - Games and Economic Behavior

    SN - 0899-8256

    ER -