Testable implications of the core in TU market games

Yasushi Agatsuma

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    This paper clarifies testable implications of the core on allocation data in cooperative market games with transferable utility (TU market games). By employing the revealed preference approach, we provide a finite system of inequalities whose solvability is equivalent to an allocation data set to be consistent with the core of some TU market game. If initial endowment vectors are not observed, it turns out that the core rationalizability is equivalent to the Pareto rationalizability, that is, the core and Pareto optimality are observationally equivalent in TU market games.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)23-29
    Number of pages7
    JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
    Volume64
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2016 May 1

    Fingerprint

    Data Allocation
    Game
    Revealed Preference
    Pareto Optimality
    Pareto
    Solvability
    Market
    Market games
    Rationalizability

    Keywords

    • Core rationalization
    • Market games
    • Pareto rationalization
    • Revealed preference
    • Testable implications

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Applied Mathematics

    Cite this

    Testable implications of the core in TU market games. / Agatsuma, Yasushi.

    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 64, 01.05.2016, p. 23-29.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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