The balanced contributions property for equal contributors

Koji Yokote, Takumi Kongo, Yukihiko Funaki

    Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

    3 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    We introduce a new axiom, which we term the balanced contributions property for equal contributors. This axiom is defined by restricting the requirement of the balanced contributions property () to two players whose contributions to the grand coalition are the same. We prove that this axiom, together with efficiency and weak covariance, characterizes a new class of solutions, termed the r-egalitarian Shapley values. This class subsumes many variants of the Shapley value, e.g., the egalitarian Shapley values and the discounted Shapley values. Our characterization provides a new axiomatic foundation for analyzing variants of the Shapley value in a unified manner.

    Original languageEnglish
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    DOIs
    Publication statusAccepted/In press - 2017

    Fingerprint

    Shapley value
    Axiom
    Axiomatics

    Keywords

    • Axiomatization
    • Balanced contributions property
    • Shapley value
    • TU games

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Finance
    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    The balanced contributions property for equal contributors. / Yokote, Koji; Kongo, Takumi; Funaki, Yukihiko.

    In: Games and Economic Behavior, 2017.

    Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

    Yokote, K, Kongo, T & Funaki, Y 2017, 'The balanced contributions property for equal contributors', Games and Economic Behavior. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.007
    Yokote K, Kongo T, Funaki Y. The balanced contributions property for equal contributors. Games and Economic Behavior. 2017. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.007
    Yokote, Koji ; Kongo, Takumi ; Funaki, Yukihiko. / The balanced contributions property for equal contributors. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2017.
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