TY - JOUR
T1 - The balanced contributions property for equal contributors
AU - Yokote, Koji
AU - Kongo, Takumi
AU - Funaki, Yukihiko
PY - 2017
Y1 - 2017
N2 - We introduce a new axiom, which we term the balanced contributions property for equal contributors. This axiom is defined by restricting the requirement of the balanced contributions property () to two players whose contributions to the grand coalition are the same. We prove that this axiom, together with efficiency and weak covariance, characterizes a new class of solutions, termed the r-egalitarian Shapley values. This class subsumes many variants of the Shapley value, e.g., the egalitarian Shapley values and the discounted Shapley values. Our characterization provides a new axiomatic foundation for analyzing variants of the Shapley value in a unified manner.
AB - We introduce a new axiom, which we term the balanced contributions property for equal contributors. This axiom is defined by restricting the requirement of the balanced contributions property () to two players whose contributions to the grand coalition are the same. We prove that this axiom, together with efficiency and weak covariance, characterizes a new class of solutions, termed the r-egalitarian Shapley values. This class subsumes many variants of the Shapley value, e.g., the egalitarian Shapley values and the discounted Shapley values. Our characterization provides a new axiomatic foundation for analyzing variants of the Shapley value in a unified manner.
KW - Axiomatization
KW - Balanced contributions property
KW - Shapley value
KW - TU games
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U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.007
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.007
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85028448882
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
SN - 0899-8256
ER -