The balanced contributions property for symmetric players

Koji Yokote, Takumi Kongo

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    5 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    This paper introduces a new relational axiom, the balanced contributions property for symmetric players, in TU cooperative games. It describes the fair treatment of symmetric players by restricting the requirement of the balanced contributions property to two symmetric players. Even under efficiency, our new axiom is logically independent of symmetry, which requires that symmetric players receive the same payoff. Nonetheless, in previous axiomatizations of an anonymous solution, replacing symmetry with our new axiom results in new axiomatizations of the solution.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)227-231
    Number of pages5
    JournalOperations Research Letters
    Volume45
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2017 May 1

    Keywords

    • Axiomatization
    • Balanced contribution
    • Game theory
    • Symmetry
    • TU cooperative game

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Software
    • Management Science and Operations Research
    • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
    • Applied Mathematics

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