The balanced contributions property for symmetric players

Koji Yokote, Takumi Kongo*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper introduces a new relational axiom, the balanced contributions property for symmetric players, in TU cooperative games. It describes the fair treatment of symmetric players by restricting the requirement of the balanced contributions property to two symmetric players. Even under efficiency, our new axiom is logically independent of symmetry, which requires that symmetric players receive the same payoff. Nonetheless, in previous axiomatizations of an anonymous solution, replacing symmetry with our new axiom results in new axiomatizations of the solution.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)227-231
Number of pages5
JournalOperations Research Letters
Volume45
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017 May 1

Keywords

  • Axiomatization
  • Balanced contribution
  • Game theory
  • Symmetry
  • TU cooperative game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
  • Applied Mathematics

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