Abstract
Initially this paper considers an assignment game without side payments and proves the non- emptiness of the core of it. Next, a market model with invisible goods but without the transferable utility assumption is presented, and the non-emptiness of the core and the existence of a competitive equilibrium of the market model are shown, using the first result. Finally this paper presents a generalization of the market model and also shows the non-emptiness of the core and the existence of a competitive equilibrium using the results in the previous model.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 205-232 |
| Number of pages | 28 |
| Journal | Journal of Mathematical Economics |
| Volume | 10 |
| Issue number | 2-3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1982 |
| Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Applied Mathematics
Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'The central assignment game and the assignment markets'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.
Cite this
Kaneko, M. (1982). The central assignment game and the assignment markets. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 10(2-3), 205-232. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(82)90038-6