The central assignment game and the assignment markets

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

79 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Initially this paper considers an assignment game without side payments and proves the non- emptiness of the core of it. Next, a market model with invisible goods but without the transferable utility assumption is presented, and the non-emptiness of the core and the existence of a competitive equilibrium of the market model are shown, using the first result. Finally this paper presents a generalization of the market model and also shows the non-emptiness of the core and the existence of a competitive equilibrium using the results in the previous model.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)205-232
Number of pages28
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Volume10
Issue number2-3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1982
Externally publishedYes

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Market Model
Competitive Equilibrium
Assignment
Game
Market
Assignment game
Market model
Competitive equilibrium
Model

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Applied Mathematics

Cite this

The central assignment game and the assignment markets. / Kaneko, Mamoru.

In: Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 10, No. 2-3, 1982, p. 205-232.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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