The conventionally stable sets in noncooperative games with limited observations I: Definitions and introductory arguments

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7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper attempts to define a new solution concept for n-person noncooperative games. The idea of it is close to that of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set, more precisely, is based on their 'standards of behavior' interpretation of the stable set. This new approach enables us to consider new interesting problems of information. Further this approach gives us a plausible interpretation of the Nash equilibrium concept. This paper provides the definition and considers certain general properties of our solution concept. Further we consider our solution concept for zero-sum two-person games, the prisoner's dilemma, the battle of the sexes and several simple games with a continuum of players.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)93-128
Number of pages36
JournalMathematical Social Sciences
Volume13
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1987
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Non-cooperative Game
Solution Concepts
Stable Set
Simple Game
Prisoners' Dilemma
Two-person Games
Zero sum game
Nash Equilibrium
interpretation
human being
Person
Continuum
prisoner
Observation
Solution concepts
Stable set
Non-cooperative game
Interpretation
Prisoner Dilemma

Keywords

  • battle of the sexes
  • conventionally stable response configuration
  • dilemma game with a monitoring machine
  • festival game
  • Game in normal form
  • Nash equilibrium
  • no positive informational influence
  • observation structure
  • repetition of a game
  • rumor
  • the prisoner's dilemma

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

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