The core of a continuum economy with widespread externalities and finite coalitions: From finite to continuum economies

Mamoru Kaneko*, Myrna Holtz Wooders

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

24 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

When permissible coalitions in finite economies are constrained to be small relative to the player set, the continuum model with finite coalitions and its f-core are the limits of large finite economies and their ε-cores. We show convergence both of game-theoretic structures-relatively small coalitions in the finite economies converge to finite coalitions-and of solutions-ε-cores converge to the f-core. Our convergence is carried out in the context of exchange economies with widespread externalities where the requirement that coalitions be small is critical.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)135-168
Number of pages34
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume49
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1989
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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