The core of a continuum economy with widespread externalities and finite coalitions: From finite to continuum economies

Mamoru Kaneko, Myrna Holtz Wooders

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

22 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

When permissible coalitions in finite economies are constrained to be small relative to the player set, the continuum model with finite coalitions and its f-core are the limits of large finite economies and their ε-cores. We show convergence both of game-theoretic structures-relatively small coalitions in the finite economies converge to finite coalitions-and of solutions-ε-cores converge to the f-core. Our convergence is carried out in the context of exchange economies with widespread externalities where the requirement that coalitions be small is critical.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)135-168
Number of pages34
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume49
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1989
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'The core of a continuum economy with widespread externalities and finite coalitions: From finite to continuum economies'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this