Abstract
This article reconsiders the deterrent effect in the economics of crime according to Becker-Ehrlich's model of optimal allocation of time under uncertainty. In a particular group of crime suppliers, we can think of a certain type of individuals who are concerned with the minimum time allocated to illegal activities. Thus, our analysis is closer in spirit to that of insurance under conditions of risk. It is proved that the aforementioned individuals will increase the minimum time allocated to illegal activities when the subjective probability of apprehension exogenously increases. Some empirical estimates of larceny, in Japan are provided.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 181-192 |
| Number of pages | 12 |
| Journal | Journal of Socio-Economics |
| Volume | 20 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1991 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
Cite this
The deterrent effect reconsidered : The minimum-time approach. / Akiba, Hiroya.
In: Journal of Socio-Economics, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1991, p. 181-192.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - The deterrent effect reconsidered
T2 - The minimum-time approach
AU - Akiba, Hiroya
PY - 1991
Y1 - 1991
N2 - This article reconsiders the deterrent effect in the economics of crime according to Becker-Ehrlich's model of optimal allocation of time under uncertainty. In a particular group of crime suppliers, we can think of a certain type of individuals who are concerned with the minimum time allocated to illegal activities. Thus, our analysis is closer in spirit to that of insurance under conditions of risk. It is proved that the aforementioned individuals will increase the minimum time allocated to illegal activities when the subjective probability of apprehension exogenously increases. Some empirical estimates of larceny, in Japan are provided.
AB - This article reconsiders the deterrent effect in the economics of crime according to Becker-Ehrlich's model of optimal allocation of time under uncertainty. In a particular group of crime suppliers, we can think of a certain type of individuals who are concerned with the minimum time allocated to illegal activities. Thus, our analysis is closer in spirit to that of insurance under conditions of risk. It is proved that the aforementioned individuals will increase the minimum time allocated to illegal activities when the subjective probability of apprehension exogenously increases. Some empirical estimates of larceny, in Japan are provided.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=58149206943&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=58149206943&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/S1053-5357(05)80005-8
DO - 10.1016/S1053-5357(05)80005-8
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:58149206943
VL - 20
SP - 181
EP - 192
JO - Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
JF - Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
SN - 2214-8043
IS - 2
ER -