The deterrent effect reconsidered

The minimum-time approach

Hiroya Akiba

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This article reconsiders the deterrent effect in the economics of crime according to Becker-Ehrlich's model of optimal allocation of time under uncertainty. In a particular group of crime suppliers, we can think of a certain type of individuals who are concerned with the minimum time allocated to illegal activities. Thus, our analysis is closer in spirit to that of insurance under conditions of risk. It is proved that the aforementioned individuals will increase the minimum time allocated to illegal activities when the subjective probability of apprehension exogenously increases. Some empirical estimates of larceny, in Japan are provided.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)181-192
Number of pages12
JournalJournal of Socio-Economics
Volume20
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1991
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Crime
offense
larceny
Insurance
supplier
insurance
Uncertainty
Japan
Economics
uncertainty
economics
time
Group
Suppliers
Subjective probability
Optimal allocation
Economics of crime
Allocation of time

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

The deterrent effect reconsidered : The minimum-time approach. / Akiba, Hiroya.

In: Journal of Socio-Economics, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1991, p. 181-192.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Akiba, Hiroya. / The deterrent effect reconsidered : The minimum-time approach. In: Journal of Socio-Economics. 1991 ; Vol. 20, No. 2. pp. 181-192.
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