Abstract
In this article, we empirically analyze the effect of team characteristics on a team's choice of group contract type (its governance structure) and examine the combined impact of team characteristics and the group contract choice on group and individual performance in a classroom setting. We utilize endogenous dummy variable models in both group-level and individual-level analyses due to the expected endogeneity of the contract choice. The estimation results confirm a statistically significant positive effect of a governance structure, democratic contract that includes a mechanism to punish free-riders on both group and individual performance. We also estimate switching regression models to account for the possible heterogeneous treatment effects but do not find any significant difference between the treated and the nontreated in the effect of the democratic contract option implying that the contract choice is not necessarily motivated by its performance-enhancing effect.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 463-492 |
| Number of pages | 30 |
| Journal | Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization |
| Volume | 30 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2014 Jan 1 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
- Law
Cite this
The impact of group contract and governance structure on performance - Evidence from college classrooms. / Hansen, Zeynep K.; Owan, Hideo; Pan, Jie; Sugawara, Shinya.
In: Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 30, No. 3, 01.01.2014, p. 463-492.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - The impact of group contract and governance structure on performance - Evidence from college classrooms
AU - Hansen, Zeynep K.
AU - Owan, Hideo
AU - Pan, Jie
AU - Sugawara, Shinya
PY - 2014/1/1
Y1 - 2014/1/1
N2 - In this article, we empirically analyze the effect of team characteristics on a team's choice of group contract type (its governance structure) and examine the combined impact of team characteristics and the group contract choice on group and individual performance in a classroom setting. We utilize endogenous dummy variable models in both group-level and individual-level analyses due to the expected endogeneity of the contract choice. The estimation results confirm a statistically significant positive effect of a governance structure, democratic contract that includes a mechanism to punish free-riders on both group and individual performance. We also estimate switching regression models to account for the possible heterogeneous treatment effects but do not find any significant difference between the treated and the nontreated in the effect of the democratic contract option implying that the contract choice is not necessarily motivated by its performance-enhancing effect.
AB - In this article, we empirically analyze the effect of team characteristics on a team's choice of group contract type (its governance structure) and examine the combined impact of team characteristics and the group contract choice on group and individual performance in a classroom setting. We utilize endogenous dummy variable models in both group-level and individual-level analyses due to the expected endogeneity of the contract choice. The estimation results confirm a statistically significant positive effect of a governance structure, democratic contract that includes a mechanism to punish free-riders on both group and individual performance. We also estimate switching regression models to account for the possible heterogeneous treatment effects but do not find any significant difference between the treated and the nontreated in the effect of the democratic contract option implying that the contract choice is not necessarily motivated by its performance-enhancing effect.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84906252653&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1093/jleo/ewt007
DO - 10.1093/jleo/ewt007
M3 - Article
VL - 30
SP - 463
EP - 492
JO - Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
JF - Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
SN - 8756-6222
IS - 3
ER -