Abstract
John Rawls's most mature notion of political order is stability for the right reasons. Stability for the right reasons is the kind of political order that Rawls hoped a well-ordered society could ideally achieve. In this paper, I demonstrate through the tools of modern game theory, the instability of stability for the right reasons. Specifically, I will show that a well-ordered society can completely destabilize by the introduction of an arbitrarily small number of non-compliers whenever individuals fail to achieve full common knowledge ever so slightly.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1-17 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| Journal | Episteme |
| Volume | 16 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2019 Mar 1 |
| Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- History and Philosophy of Science