The instability of John Rawls's stability for the right reasons

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

John Rawls's most mature notion of political order is stability for the right reasons. Stability for the right reasons is the kind of political order that Rawls hoped a well-ordered society could ideally achieve. In this paper, I demonstrate through the tools of modern game theory, the instability of stability for the right reasons. Specifically, I will show that a well-ordered society can completely destabilize by the introduction of an arbitrarily small number of non-compliers whenever individuals fail to achieve full common knowledge ever so slightly.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-17
Number of pages17
JournalEpisteme
Volume16
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019 Mar 1
Externally publishedYes

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John Rawls
Political Order
Common Knowledge
Game Theory

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • History and Philosophy of Science

Cite this

The instability of John Rawls's stability for the right reasons. / Chung, Hun.

In: Episteme, Vol. 16, No. 1, 01.03.2019, p. 1-17.

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

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