Abstract
John Rawls's most mature notion of political order is stability for the right reasons. Stability for the right reasons is the kind of political order that Rawls hoped a well-ordered society could ideally achieve. In this paper, I demonstrate through the tools of modern game theory, the instability of stability for the right reasons. Specifically, I will show that a well-ordered society can completely destabilize by the introduction of an arbitrarily small number of non-compliers whenever individuals fail to achieve full common knowledge ever so slightly.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1-17 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| Journal | Episteme |
| Volume | 16 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2019 Mar 1 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- History and Philosophy of Science
Cite this
The instability of John Rawls's stability for the right reasons. / Chung, Hun.
In: Episteme, Vol. 16, No. 1, 01.03.2019, p. 1-17.Research output: Contribution to journal › Review article
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TY - JOUR
T1 - The instability of John Rawls's stability for the right reasons
AU - Chung, Hun
PY - 2019/3/1
Y1 - 2019/3/1
N2 - John Rawls's most mature notion of political order is stability for the right reasons. Stability for the right reasons is the kind of political order that Rawls hoped a well-ordered society could ideally achieve. In this paper, I demonstrate through the tools of modern game theory, the instability of stability for the right reasons. Specifically, I will show that a well-ordered society can completely destabilize by the introduction of an arbitrarily small number of non-compliers whenever individuals fail to achieve full common knowledge ever so slightly.
AB - John Rawls's most mature notion of political order is stability for the right reasons. Stability for the right reasons is the kind of political order that Rawls hoped a well-ordered society could ideally achieve. In this paper, I demonstrate through the tools of modern game theory, the instability of stability for the right reasons. Specifically, I will show that a well-ordered society can completely destabilize by the introduction of an arbitrarily small number of non-compliers whenever individuals fail to achieve full common knowledge ever so slightly.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85021086322&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1017/epi.2017.14
DO - 10.1017/epi.2017.14
M3 - Review article
AN - SCOPUS:85021086322
VL - 16
SP - 1
EP - 17
JO - Episteme
JF - Episteme
SN - 1742-3600
IS - 1
ER -