The instability of John Rawls's stability for the right reasons

Hun Chung

doi:10.1017/epi.2017.14

The instability of John Rawls's stability for the right reasons

Hun Chung

Research output: Contribution to journal › Review article › peer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

John Rawls's most mature notion of political order is stability for the right reasons. Stability for the right reasons is the kind of political order that Rawls hoped a well-ordered society could ideally achieve. In this paper, I demonstrate through the tools of modern game theory, the instability of stability for the right reasons. Specifically, I will show that a well-ordered society can completely destabilize by the introduction of an arbitrarily small number of non-compliers whenever individuals fail to achieve full common knowledge ever so slightly.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1-17
Number of pages	17
Journal	Episteme
Volume	16
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2017.14
Publication status	Published - 2019 Mar 1
Externally published	Yes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

History and Philosophy of Science

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The instability of John Rawls's stability for the right reasons

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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