The nonemptiness of the f-core of a game without side payments

Mamoru Kaneko, Myrna Holtz Wooders

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

23 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We prove the nonemptiness of the core of a continuum game without side payments where only small coalitions - ones bounded in absolute size of finite cardinality - are permitted. This result covers assignment games with a continuum of players and includes combinations of several assignment games, such as housing and automobile markets.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)245-258
Number of pages14
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume25
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 1996
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

motor vehicle
coalition
housing
Game
market
Continuum
Assignment
Automobile
Coalitions
Cardinality
Cover
Side payments
Assignment game
Continuum of players
Housing market
Automobile market
Market

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)

Cite this

The nonemptiness of the f-core of a game without side payments. / Kaneko, Mamoru; Wooders, Myrna Holtz.

In: International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1996, p. 245-258.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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