The nonemptiness of the f-core of a game without side payments

Mamoru Kaneko, Myrna Holtz Wooders

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

23 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We prove the nonemptiness of the core of a continuum game without side payments where only small coalitions - ones bounded in absolute size of finite cardinality - are permitted. This result covers assignment games with a continuum of players and includes combinations of several assignment games, such as housing and automobile markets.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)245-258
Number of pages14
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume25
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 1996
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)

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