The Performance Effects and Determinants of Corporate Governance Reform 1

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This chapter addresses the introduction of the executive officer system as an alternative to the traditional insider board structure. As a result, since 1997 board sizes have decreased and a greater separation has been made between monitoring and management responsibilities. Some firms have also introduced outside directors and performance-related compensation schemes, such as stock options. The extent of these reforms among Japanese firms is examined using a survey-based Corporate Governance Score (CGS) for each corporation. Higher CGS scores are associated with better performance, a higher percentage of foreign shareholders, and a lower percentage of stable shareholders. However, among firms exposed to capital market pressures, the presence of strong employee participation also has a significant positive impact on the degree of reform and suggests a strong mutual reliance on capital markets and long-term employment among strongly performing Japanese firms.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationCorporate Governance in Japan: Institutional Change and Organizational Diversity
PublisherOxford University Press
ISBN (Print)9780191713705, 9780199284511
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2007 Sep 1
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Corporate governance reform
Japanese firms
Corporate governance
Capital markets
Shareholders
Insider
Board size
Stock options
Board structure
Monitoring
Employee participation
Responsibility
Outside directors

Keywords

  • Board of directors
  • Employee participation
  • Independence
  • Japanese economy
  • Non-executive directors
  • Shareholder rights

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Cite this

Miyajima, H. (2007). The Performance Effects and Determinants of Corporate Governance Reform 1. In Corporate Governance in Japan: Institutional Change and Organizational Diversity Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284511.003.0012

The Performance Effects and Determinants of Corporate Governance Reform 1. / Miyajima, Hideaki.

Corporate Governance in Japan: Institutional Change and Organizational Diversity. Oxford University Press, 2007.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Miyajima, H 2007, The Performance Effects and Determinants of Corporate Governance Reform 1. in Corporate Governance in Japan: Institutional Change and Organizational Diversity. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284511.003.0012
Miyajima H. The Performance Effects and Determinants of Corporate Governance Reform 1. In Corporate Governance in Japan: Institutional Change and Organizational Diversity. Oxford University Press. 2007 https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284511.003.0012
Miyajima, Hideaki. / The Performance Effects and Determinants of Corporate Governance Reform 1. Corporate Governance in Japan: Institutional Change and Organizational Diversity. Oxford University Press, 2007.
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