The ratio equilibrium and a voting game in a public goods economy

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Abstract

An economic model of the allocation process with public goods is presented. We define a concept of equilibrium and prove the existence. Next we present a voting game in which a level of the public goods to be produced is decided. We prove that the core of the voting game and the equilibria exist simultaneously, and that they coincide.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)123-136
Number of pages14
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume16
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1977
Externally publishedYes

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Cite this

The ratio equilibrium and a voting game in a public goods economy. / Kaneko, Mamoru.

In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1977, p. 123-136.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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