The ratio equilibrium and a voting game in a public goods economy

Mamoru Kaneko

doi:10.1016/0022-0531(77)90001-1

The ratio equilibrium and a voting game in a public goods economy

Mamoru Kaneko^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

76 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

An economic model of the allocation process with public goods is presented. We define a concept of equilibrium and prove the existence. Next we present a voting game in which a level of the public goods to be produced is decided. We prove that the core of the voting game and the equilibria exist simultaneously, and that they coincide.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	123-136
Number of pages	14
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	16
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(77)90001-1
Publication status	Published - 1977
Externally published	Yes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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abstract = "An economic model of the allocation process with public goods is presented. We define a concept of equilibrium and prove the existence. Next we present a voting game in which a level of the public goods to be produced is decided. We prove that the core of the voting game and the equilibria exist simultaneously, and that they coincide.",

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The ratio equilibrium and a voting game in a public goods economy

Abstract

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