The transfer paradox in a pay-as-you-go pension system

Kojun Hamada, Akihiko Kaneko, Mitsuyoshi Yanagihara

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    1 Citation (Scopus)

    Abstract

    We examine how international transfers affect the welfare levels of a donor with a higher marginal propensity to save and a recipient with a lower marginal propensity to save when both countries adopt a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system using a one-sector overlapping generations model. We demonstrate that in a dynamically efficient economy, except at the golden rule, when a per capita PAYG pension contribution of either a donor or a recipient increases marginally, the effect of the transfer on the donor’s welfare can be reduced, whereas whether the effect of the transfer on the recipient’s welfare is reduced is ambiguous. These results imply that the existence of a PAYG pension might hinder the effectiveness of the transfer on the donor’s welfare, and the adoption of a PAYG pension system is likely to cause a weak transfer paradox in which both a donor and a recipient immiserize. Our results also suggest that the introduction of a PAYG pension system, which is used as a domestic policy instrument for intergenerational income redistribution, reduces the donor’s incentive to make an international transfer to a recipient, which is a form of international income redistribution.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)1-18
    Number of pages18
    JournalInternational Economics and Economic Policy
    DOIs
    Publication statusAccepted/In press - 2016 Mar 29

    Fingerprint

    Transfer paradox
    Pay-as-you-go pension
    Pension system
    Income redistribution
    Propensity
    International transfers
    Overlapping generations model
    Policy instruments
    Incentives
    Golden rule

    Keywords

    • Capital accumulation
    • Overlapping generations model
    • Pay-as-you-go pension
    • Transfer paradox

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    The transfer paradox in a pay-as-you-go pension system. / Hamada, Kojun; Kaneko, Akihiko; Yanagihara, Mitsuyoshi.

    In: International Economics and Economic Policy, 29.03.2016, p. 1-18.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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