The uniform rule with several commodities

A generalization of Sprumont's characterization

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    6 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    This paper considers the problem of allocating multiple divisible commodities among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences. We show that the uniform rule is the only allocation rule that satisfies strategy-proofness, envy-freeness, and same-sidedness: the third axiom is a weak efficiency condition that is equivalent to Pareto efficiency in the single-commodity case. Therefore, this result generalizes the characterization of the uniform rule by Sprumont (1991. Econometrica 59 (2), 509-519) in the single-commodity case: it is the only rule satisfying strategy-proofness, envy-freeness, and Pareto efficiency.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)952-964
    Number of pages13
    JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
    Volume46
    Issue number6
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2010 Nov 20

    Fingerprint

    Pareto Efficiency
    Strategy-proofness
    Weak Efficiency
    Divisible
    Axiom
    Generalise
    Generalization
    Uniform rule
    Commodities
    Pareto efficiency
    Envy-freeness

    Keywords

    • Multiple divisible commodities
    • Single-peaked preferences
    • Strategy-proofness
    • Uniform rule

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Applied Mathematics

    Cite this

    The uniform rule with several commodities : A generalization of Sprumont's characterization. / Adachi, Tsuyoshi.

    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 46, No. 6, 20.11.2010, p. 952-964.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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