Theoretical and experimental investigations of the performance of keyword auction mechanisms

Emiko Fukuda, Yoshio Kamijo, Ai Takeuchi, Michiharu Masui, Yukihiko Funaki

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    9 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Two keyword auction mechanisms, the Generalized Second-Price auction (GSP) and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (VCG), were compared theoretically and experimentally. The former is widely used in practice; the latter is not, but it has a dominant strategy equilibrium where all participants bid their true values. In the theoretical investigation, by applying the "locally envy-free Nash equilibrium" to the VCG, we found that the allocations are efficient and that upper and lower bounds of the auctioneer's revenue coincide in the two mechanisms. A laboratory experiment, in which the revenues and efficiencies were similar in both mechanisms, supported this result.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)438-461
    Number of pages24
    JournalRAND Journal of Economics
    Volume44
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2013 Sep

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    Key words
    Auctions
    Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
    Revenue
    Second-price auction
    Laboratory experiments
    Upper bound
    Dominant strategy
    Nash equilibrium
    Lower bounds
    Bid
    Envy-free

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Theoretical and experimental investigations of the performance of keyword auction mechanisms. / Fukuda, Emiko; Kamijo, Yoshio; Takeuchi, Ai; Masui, Michiharu; Funaki, Yukihiko.

    In: RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 44, No. 3, 09.2013, p. 438-461.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Fukuda, Emiko ; Kamijo, Yoshio ; Takeuchi, Ai ; Masui, Michiharu ; Funaki, Yukihiko. / Theoretical and experimental investigations of the performance of keyword auction mechanisms. In: RAND Journal of Economics. 2013 ; Vol. 44, No. 3. pp. 438-461.
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