Two-person ex post implementation

Yoshihiro Ohashi

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    1 Citation (Scopus)

    Abstract

    This paper investigates the ex post implementation of a social choice set with two agents. A social choice set F is ex post implementable with two agents if F satisfies the conditions of ex post incentive compatibility (EPIC) and ex post monotonicity (EM) in an environment that is economic and has a bad outcome. Furthermore, if F is a social choice function, (EPIC), (EM), and an economic environment are sufficient.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)435-440
    Number of pages6
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume75
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2012 May

    Fingerprint

    Monotonicity
    Choice sets
    Incentive compatibility
    Social choice
    Economic environment
    Social choice function
    Economics

    Keywords

    • Ex post equilibrium
    • Implementation
    • Two-person

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Finance

    Cite this

    Two-person ex post implementation. / Ohashi, Yoshihiro.

    In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 75, No. 1, 05.2012, p. 435-440.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Ohashi, Yoshihiro. / Two-person ex post implementation. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2012 ; Vol. 75, No. 1. pp. 435-440.
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