Two-person ex post implementation

Yoshihiro Ohashi

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2011.09.006

Two-person ex post implementation

Yoshihiro Ohashi^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper investigates the ex post implementation of a social choice set with two agents. A social choice set F is ex post implementable with two agents if F satisfies the conditions of ex post incentive compatibility (EPIC) and ex post monotonicity (EM) in an environment that is economic and has a bad outcome. Furthermore, if F is a social choice function, (EPIC), (EM), and an economic environment are sufficient.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	435-440
Number of pages	6
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	75
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.09.006
Publication status	Published - 2012 May

Keywords

Ex post equilibrium
Implementation
Two-person

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics
Finance

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10.1016/j.geb.2011.09.006

Cite this

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Two-person ex post implementation

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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