Two-sided matching problems with externalities

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

30 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, we develop a model of two-sided matching markets with externalities. A new concept of stability of matchings is proposed and it is shown to be the unique one that ensures the general existence. Moreover, it is demonstrated that our stability does not contradict Pareto optimality. Some extensions of the model are also discussed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D62.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)93-108
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume70
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1996 Jul

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Two-sided matching
Matching problem
Externalities
Economics
Pareto optimality
Matching markets

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Two-sided matching problems with externalities. / Sasaki, Hiroo; Toda, Manabu.

In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 70, No. 1, 07.1996, p. 93-108.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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