Two-sided matching problems with externalities

Hiroo Sasaki*, Manabu Toda

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

58 Citations (Scopus)


In this paper, we develop a model of two-sided matching markets with externalities. A new concept of stability of matchings is proposed and it is shown to be the unique one that ensures the general existence. Moreover, it is demonstrated that our stability does not contradict Pareto optimality. Some extensions of the model are also discussed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D62.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)93-108
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 1996 Jul
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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