Vertical integration in the telecommunication market

Deok Joo Lee, Hiroshi Katayama, Hyung Sik Oh

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    In this paper, the policy issues of the vertical integration in the telecommunication market are discussed in the economic standpoint. A simple but robust game model about the vertical integration is developed to analyze the relationship between telecommunication common carriers and service providers. We also consider network externality on demand function, which is one of the essential characteristics of telecommunication market. The Nash equilibrium prices and the profits under both cases of vertical integrated and non-integrated markets are derived, and the welfare implications of the vertical integration are discussed. One of the significant result obtained from this study is that consumers are always better off under the vertical integration.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)841-844
    Number of pages4
    JournalComputers and Industrial Engineering
    Volume33
    Issue number3-4
    Publication statusPublished - 1997 Dec

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    Keywords

    • Game theory
    • Network externality
    • Telecommunication
    • Vertical integration

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Information Systems and Management
    • Management Science and Operations Research
    • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
    • Applied Mathematics

    Cite this

    Lee, D. J., Katayama, H., & Oh, H. S. (1997). Vertical integration in the telecommunication market. Computers and Industrial Engineering, 33(3-4), 841-844.