Vertical integration in the telecommunication market

Deok Joo Lee, Hiroshi Katayama, Hyung Sik Oh

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    In this paper, the policy issues of the vertical integration in the telecommunication market are discussed in the economic standpoint. A simple but robust game model about the vertical integration is developed to analyze the relationship between telecommunication common carriers and service providers. We also consider network externality on demand function, which is one of the essential characteristics of telecommunication market. The Nash equilibrium prices and the profits under both cases of vertical integrated and non-integrated markets are derived, and the welfare implications of the vertical integration are discussed. One of the significant result obtained from this study is that consumers are always better off under the vertical integration.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)841-844
    Number of pages4
    JournalComputers and Industrial Engineering
    Volume33
    Issue number3-4
    Publication statusPublished - 1997 Dec

    Fingerprint

    Telecommunications
    Telecommunication
    Vertical
    Profitability
    Externalities
    Welfare
    Economics
    Nash Equilibrium
    Profit
    Market
    Vertical integration
    Game

    Keywords

    • Game theory
    • Network externality
    • Telecommunication
    • Vertical integration

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Information Systems and Management
    • Management Science and Operations Research
    • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
    • Applied Mathematics

    Cite this

    Lee, D. J., Katayama, H., & Oh, H. S. (1997). Vertical integration in the telecommunication market. Computers and Industrial Engineering, 33(3-4), 841-844.

    Vertical integration in the telecommunication market. / Lee, Deok Joo; Katayama, Hiroshi; Oh, Hyung Sik.

    In: Computers and Industrial Engineering, Vol. 33, No. 3-4, 12.1997, p. 841-844.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Lee, DJ, Katayama, H & Oh, HS 1997, 'Vertical integration in the telecommunication market', Computers and Industrial Engineering, vol. 33, no. 3-4, pp. 841-844.
    Lee, Deok Joo ; Katayama, Hiroshi ; Oh, Hyung Sik. / Vertical integration in the telecommunication market. In: Computers and Industrial Engineering. 1997 ; Vol. 33, No. 3-4. pp. 841-844.
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