Abstract
In this paper, the policy issues of the vertical integration in the telecommunication market are discussed in the economic standpoint. A simple but robust game model about the vertical integration is developed to analyze the relationship between telecommunication common carriers and service providers. We also consider network externality on demand function, which is one of the essential characteristics of telecommunication market. The Nash equilibrium prices and the profits under both cases of vertical integrated and non-integrated markets are derived, and the welfare implications of the vertical integration are discussed. One of the significant result obtained from this study is that consumers are always better off under the vertical integration.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 841-844 |
| Number of pages | 4 |
| Journal | Computers and Industrial Engineering |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue number | 3-4 |
| Publication status | Published - 1997 Dec |
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Keywords
- Game theory
- Network externality
- Telecommunication
- Vertical integration
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Information Systems and Management
- Management Science and Operations Research
- Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
- Applied Mathematics
Cite this
Vertical integration in the telecommunication market. / Lee, Deok Joo; Katayama, Hiroshi; Oh, Hyung Sik.
In: Computers and Industrial Engineering, Vol. 33, No. 3-4, 12.1997, p. 841-844.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Vertical integration in the telecommunication market
AU - Lee, Deok Joo
AU - Katayama, Hiroshi
AU - Oh, Hyung Sik
PY - 1997/12
Y1 - 1997/12
N2 - In this paper, the policy issues of the vertical integration in the telecommunication market are discussed in the economic standpoint. A simple but robust game model about the vertical integration is developed to analyze the relationship between telecommunication common carriers and service providers. We also consider network externality on demand function, which is one of the essential characteristics of telecommunication market. The Nash equilibrium prices and the profits under both cases of vertical integrated and non-integrated markets are derived, and the welfare implications of the vertical integration are discussed. One of the significant result obtained from this study is that consumers are always better off under the vertical integration.
AB - In this paper, the policy issues of the vertical integration in the telecommunication market are discussed in the economic standpoint. A simple but robust game model about the vertical integration is developed to analyze the relationship between telecommunication common carriers and service providers. We also consider network externality on demand function, which is one of the essential characteristics of telecommunication market. The Nash equilibrium prices and the profits under both cases of vertical integrated and non-integrated markets are derived, and the welfare implications of the vertical integration are discussed. One of the significant result obtained from this study is that consumers are always better off under the vertical integration.
KW - Game theory
KW - Network externality
KW - Telecommunication
KW - Vertical integration
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0031383024&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0031383024&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0031383024
VL - 33
SP - 841
EP - 844
JO - Computers and Industrial Engineering
JF - Computers and Industrial Engineering
SN - 0360-8352
IS - 3-4
ER -