Weak differential marginality and the Shapley value

André Casajus, Koji Yokote

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    6 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    The principle of differential marginality for cooperative games states that the differential of two players’ payoffs does not change when the differential of these players’ marginal contributions to coalitions containing neither of them does not change. Together with two standard properties, efficiency and the null player property, differential marginality characterizes the Shapley value. For games that contain more than two players, we show that this characterization can be improved by using a substantially weaker property than differential marginality. Weak differential marginality requires two players’ payoffs to change in the same direction when these players’ marginal contributions to coalitions containing neither of them change by the same amount.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)274-284
    Number of pages11
    JournalJournal of Economic Theory
    Volume167
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2017 Jan 1

    Fingerprint

    Shapley value
    Marginality
    Marginal contribution
    Cooperative game

    Keywords

    • Differential marginality
    • Shapley value
    • TU game
    • Weak differential marginality

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Weak differential marginality and the Shapley value. / Casajus, André; Yokote, Koji.

    In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 167, 01.01.2017, p. 274-284.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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