A coalition formation value for games in partition function form

Michel Grabisch*, Yukihiko Funaki

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

15 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

The coalition formation problem in an economy with externalities can be adequately modeled by using games in partition function form (PFF games), proposed by Thrall and Lucas. If we suppose that forming the grand coalition generates the largest total surplus, a central question is how to allocate the worth of the grand coalition to each player, i.e.; how to find an adequate solution concept, taking into account the whole process of coalition formation. We propose in this paper the original concepts of scenario-value, process-value and coalition formation value, which represent the average contribution of players in a scenario (a particular sequence of coalitions within a given coalition formation process), in a process (a sequence of partitions of the society), and in the whole (all processes being taken into account), respectively. We give also two axiomatizations of our coalition formation value.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)175-185
ページ数11
ジャーナルEuropean Journal of Operational Research
221
1
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2012 8 16

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • コンピュータ サイエンス(全般)
  • モデリングとシミュレーション
  • 経営科学およびオペレーションズ リサーチ
  • 情報システムおよび情報管理

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